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A. Importance 
Chapter I 
mTRODUCTION 
It is rare when one finds an outstanding scholar I 
climb down from his "ivory tower" to enter the hard-boiled, 
rough-and-tumble' game of politics. It is even more of a I 
rarity to view an over-aged man of fifty years with many 
physical deficiencies and a belief in the religion of the 
Society of Friends entering the military service in the 
lowest rank and emerging a wounded hero. Again it is un-
usual to see an erudite liberal writer who castigated the 
Democratic Party as being one controlled by irresponsible 
backward Southern conservative.s, corrupt urban bosses, and 
wealthy Raskob interests and who pleaded for a Third Party 
to enter the political field become an outstanding leader 
in the Democratic Party. A rare and unusual man indeed is 
Paul Howard Douglas. 
The name of Paul Howard Douglas is one that is 
rapidly becoming known and recognized throughout the 
length and breadth of the United States. The name has 
been known in economic societi-es and circles since the 
publication of his first book in the early Twenties; but 
to the public-at-large, the name of Paul Howard Douglas 
has held little appeal in the national press. Then in 
1 
I 
., 
II 
,, 
1948 the State of Illinois sent the man to the upper house 
of Congress, and at once the press and the public recog-
nized a man big in stature. 
Since 1948, the scholar• and economist Douglas has 
been pushed into the background and a new character has 
emerged. The press is following every action and word of 
Douglas very olosely as the newsmen see in the man that 
mystery element of "color." In reports from periodicals 
throughout the country, Douglas is being hailed as one of 
the most brilliant "freshman" Senators ever to enter Con-
gress, the Abraham Lincoln of 1950, and a potential White 
House occupant. 
This work is important, I believe, because it is the 
first written paper which has attempted to piece together 
the stature of the man Douglas and the economist Douglas. 
Research on Douglas has indicated that prior to 1948 the 
books and articles written by him in the field of economics 
were, in the main, the only record of the man; but since 
1948, in many articles concerning the Senator, economics 
has been cast aside in order to present a biography of his 
life. Thus, by molding together his economic theories with 
a study of his background, the true stature of Paul Howard 
Douglas can more clearly be discerned. 
B. Scope of Subject 
In the second chapter of this study, an attempt will 
2 
be made to present different periods in the .life of Douglas 
which were extremely influential in his development as one 
of the most important figures in contemporary America. The 
third chapter of this work is then devoted to Douglas' 
growth as an economist, from his doctoral dissertation to 
his ascendancy to the presidency of the American Economic 
Association. In the fourth chapter Douglas probes into the 
unemployment question and presents an important contribution 
to the widespread thinking on this subject in his proposals 
to weed out the cancers of this economic disease. Then, 
the fifth chapter offers a discussion of Douglas' work on 
wage payments, the measurement of the purchasing power of 
the laboring class, and wage theory. The final chapter 
attempts to present some conclusions about the stature of 
the economist and of the individual, Paul Howard Douglas. 
3 
Chapter II 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MAN, PAUL HOWARD DOUGLAS 
~study o~ Paul Howard Douglas' economics would be 
incomplete without some re~erences to places and events 
which were important in shaping his career and person-
ality. It is o~ great interest to look at the man--aside 
~rom his important writings in economics--since he is one 
o~ the most versatile Americans of our time. Douglas' 
stature would be significant if he were to have confined 
himself to the study, teaching and writing of economics 
solely; but yet in his background the picture o~ crusader, 
fighter, politician, humanitarian is ever present. The 
past ~ifty-eight years o~ Douglas' life have been more 
fUlly packed with achievements and merit and controversy 
than those o~ most o~ his contemporaries; yet it is very 
possible that in the next decade or two the man Douglas 
may gain ~arne and position that will dwar~ his past 
standing. 
A. Early Years in New England 
Paul Douglas' early years were very significant in 
the molding of his development since they enveloped him 
with a ~eeling of rugged independence and aggressiveness. 
1 Born in Salem, Massachusetts on March 26, 1892 o~ old New 
I 
4 
lj 5 
1 
England stock of sailors, shipbuilders, and storekeepers, II 
Douglas was indoctrinated in the first years of his life in lj 
the hard-working, frugal, realistic Yankee way-of-life. At 
an early age the Douglas family moved into the sparsely 
settled backwoods area in Maine. The family settled in a 
log cabin on a hillside near Moosehead Lake, and lived a 
2 
pioneer type of rural existence. 
The young Douglas was eager to gain an education, 
but the little rural school had little to offer the keen 
youth. His stepmother, a teacher, taught Paul his lessons 
3 during his grammar school years; and the boy had actually 
only one term of grammar school preparation prior to his 
entrance into high school. 
Fortunately, a number of the periodicals of the day 
reached this distant log cabin as his stepmother had as one 
of her main pleasures the reading of contemporary affairs. 
The young Douglas devoured all literary material that 
entered the house and mulled over every article he read. 
Works by the popular muckrakers of the day entered the 
cabin frequently and were influential in training Paul's 
thinking. He was greatly stimulated and excited by the 
1 
2 
3 
I 
Morris, Joe Alex, "Senator Douglas : Hard-Boiled Idealist, nil 
The Saturday Evening Post, 222:107, August 6, 1949. 
Sawyer, Whit, Editorial in The Boston Daily Globe, 
December 12, 1950. 
~· 
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I 
sensational exposes of the muckrakers in the New York World II 
I 
and McClure's Magazine. 
Paul's education might not have advanced in a formal 
fashion had not the Douglas family moved to Newport, Maine. 
There much to the boy's delight he could attend the local 
high school. The young Douglas was an excellent student 
and aggressively absorbed as much knowledge as was forth-
coming in the small-town school. After school hours, he 
earned money to contribute to the household expenditures by 
. 4 
working in the town's express and baggage station. 
Thus, Douglas• youth was spent in Maine amidst 
traditional respectable poverty. The meager state of the 
family • s financial resources and his rural surroundings were II 
influential upon his thinking concerning the true value of I 
money. In his speech Douglas retains to this day the accent 
5 
and :flavor of the "downeast." 
B. College Days 
Eager to obtain more learning, the young Douglas pre-
vailed upon his brother to assist him financially so that 
he could matriculate at Bowdoin College. He needed finan-
cial aid for the first year only, however, as he obtained 
4 Morris, ~· £!i, P• 107. 
5 Smith, Mortimer, "Senator Paul H. Douglas," The American 
Mercury, :71:28, July, 1950. 
6 
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several odd jobs to pay his way through college. During 
the school year be earned money by waiting on table at the 
Delta Upsilon Fraternity House and by peddling flavoring 
6 
extracts throughout Brunswick, Maine and its environs. 
During the sumner vacation periods he added to his small 
resources by working at far.ming, lumberjacking, and cement-
handling. 
Douglas pursued his college education most vigorously 
in his quest for learning as much about each subject he 
tackled as possible. However, he did not confine himself' to 
scholarship entirely as he wanted to distinguish himself' in 
athletics also. Physically large and strong, he became an 
excellent center on the Bowdoin football team and an average 
pugilist on the boxing squad. Thus, he made his mark in his 
undergraduate days as both a Phi Beta Kappa student and an 
7 
excellent athlete. 
During his Bowdoin years Douglas portrayed some of' 
his later characteristics by being an outspoken reformer 
and radical when speaking on controversial issues of the 
day. SUmner Pike, present member of the Atomic Energy Com-
mission and classmate of' Douglas• at Bowdoin, said of 
Douglas that, "If he could find a minority he'd go with it • 
••• to the left of Eugene v. Debs, who was tried i'or 
6 Sawyer, loc. £!1· 
7 Morris, loc. £!!., P• 107. 
7 
8 
something about once every four years." 
The most significant point in his college years was 
Douglas' falling under the influence of Professor Warren 
Catlin of the economics department. The young student 
found Professor Catlin's teaching most stimulating and de-
cided to make economics his major field of endeavor. Pro-
fessor Catlin saw in Douglas a keen~ analytical mind and 
urged him to ever broaden his search of the problems of the 
9 
field. Douglas~ ever a realist in his thinking, discovered 
that in economics he could learn more of the hard facts of 
money and poverty which he knew so well; he could ascertain 
why the economic life worked as it did; and, perhaps~ he 
could some day propose methods to relieve the miseries of 
the ill-fed and the downtrodden. 
After graduating from Bowdoin~ Douglas received a 
scholarship for two years study in economics at tbe Graduate 
School of Columbia University. He received a degree of 
Master of Arts there in 1915. In 1915 and 1916 he studied 
economics as a graduate student at Harvard University. He 
returned to Columbia later and obtain his Doctor of Philoso-
10 phy degree there in 1921. 
8 "Making of a Maverick," ~' 55:18, Januacy 16~ 1950. 
9 Sawyer, loc • ill· 
10 - ~· 
8 
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c. The E£fect of World War I 
Although a poor country boy, Douglas had managed to 
obtain his undergraduate and graduate education through the 
workings of his own scholastic and physical efforts. He had ' 
found life during this stage of his development fairly 
satisfactory. 
When the United States entered World War I however, 
Douglas was confronted with a major problem as to whether 
be should enlist in the military service or not. In his 
thinking about the war he opposed the sending of men of the 
United States to aid the Allied Powers; but he favored 
granting the Allied Powers our economic aid.· He thought 
that his country could best assist the war against Germany 
by using our industrial strength to supply the European 
Allies with guns and tanks and planes. 
Thus Douglas did not volunteer for military service 
in 1917. His mind wrestled with the issue confronting him 
constantly. Should he follow the dictates of his own 
opinions about the war, or should he serve his country in 
whatever course it might take? Finally in the gwmmer of 
1918 when the war was nearly at its conclusion, Douglas 
volunteered for Army service. He was rejected because of 
defective vision. 
In the period between World Wars I and II, Douglas 
was often harried by reflections of his state of indecision 
during the national emergency of 1917-18. His pacifistic 
9 
approach to the crisis plagued him throughout the years as 
it was a painful past experience in his memory. 11 When the 
same issue presented itsel£ once again in 1942, Douglas 
acted immediately to attempt to erase the past £rom his 
mind. Douglas' position in World War II will be discussed 
in a later part or this chapter. 
D. Conversion to Quakerism 
One of the most significant £actors in molding 
Douglas• social philosophy was his conversion to the re-
ligion of the Quaker. One or his favorite pastimes was 
reading biography, and he chanced upon The Journal of John 
Woolman. Douglas was greatly moved by the activities of 
Woolman, an eighteenth century Quaker who consecrated his 
life to the persuasion or slaveholders to emancipate their 
negro slaves. He admired the reeling or love for his fellow 
man as displayed by Woolman and described him as "a real 
12 
saint." 
Thus Douglas converted from the Episcopalian religion 
to the Society of Friends in 1920. His religious thinking 
and his outward behavior were greatly affected by his asso-
ciation with the Quakers since he was motivated to treat 
every man as his brother and to do good works whenever 
11 Morris, loc. cit., pp. 107-108. 
12 Ibid., P• 107. 
10 
possible. Besides the creed of "good works 11 which finally 
drove him into polities, Douglas became one free of personal 
animosity with a feeling of friendliness, love, and pity for 
all mankind. 13 
The Society of Friends supplied Douglas with the 
inward spiritual grace which would serve him in presenting 
the outward and visible form of his economic machinery. 
Douglas has stated, "This I believe to be the central doc-
trine taught by Christ: that this radiating of good-will 
makes one a participant in the creative processes of life.n14 
Thus through his ardent belief in and practice of the doe-
trines of the Society of Friends, Douglas has always been 
able to assume an objective and moderate approach to the 
controversial maelstroms in whiCh he has constantly flung 
himself headlong. 
E. The Hart, Sob,af,.bJer, and Marx Prize 
A strong influence in guiding Douglas' res~aroh in 
the field of economies emanated from the Hart, Schaffner, 
and Marx Prize offered in 1926. This men's clothing manu-
faoturing concern had established twenty-seven years before 
a fund to offer annual prizes on economic subjects "to draw 
13 Smith, loc. ~., PP• 28•29. 
14 Allen, Devere, Adventurous Americans (New York: Farrar 
and Rinehart, 1932), p. 182. 
ll 
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the attention of American youth to the study of econo~c 
and commercial subjects and to encourage the best thinking 
of the country to investigate the problems which vitally 
15 
ai'f'ect the business world of' ·the day. 11 
In 1926 a Committee, a distinguish ed group of' 
Professors of' Economics, acting upon authorization of' the 
donors announced a prize of' f'ive thousand dollars f'or the 
best original economic work on the theory of' wages. Eligi-
bility f'or the competition was extended not only to American 
scholars as in previous years, but also to international 
authorities. Moreover, it was added that, "The prize will 
16 
not be awarded except for a work of high merit." 
The monetary reward offered for the economic treatise 
was a large one, and Douglas was determined to try f'or it. 
He worked exceedingly hard on his study of wages and sub-
mitted a manuscript consisting of three parts: "(1} a his-
tory of past wage theories, (2) a more or less original ex-
planation of general wages drawn in terms of relative elas-
ticities of supply, and (3) the theory of occupational and 
17 geographical differences in wage rates." 
The Committee received one hundred and thirty 
15 Douglas, Paul H., The Theory of' Wages (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1934), P• vii. 
16 1!!.19· 
17 ~·~ P• xi. 
12 
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manuscripts from leading economists throughout the world. 
On March 26, 1927~ the Committee awarded Douglas' work first 
18 prize by unanimous vote in the international competition. 
Although Douglas' treatise was considered a great 
contribution, in the field of wages, it was felt to be in-
complete and was returned to him for fUrther development and 
research. Additional time was granted him to test and 
amplify his significant study. It was not until 1934 that 
Douglas finally completed his last revision after studying 
the theory of wages much more extensively than for the 
original competition manuscript. However, the Committee and 
the donors considered the experiment worth-while since they 
felt that Douglas' work "had here aided notably the advance 
19 
of economic analysis in one of its most difficult fields." 
F. Liberalism to the Fore 
During the 1920's and the early 1930's Douglas• views 
crystallized into an extremely liberalistic pattern. Although 
his work as a teacher of economics was patterned in a scien-
tifie approach to the economic problems, he was an extremely 
emotional person and had to beca.ma a propagandist and a 
politician to explain his methods for counteracting the 
cancers of mankind. He edited The World Tomorrow, a 
18 Douglas, 2E• £!i., p. viii. 
19 ~· 
13 
crusading magazine, Which espoused nebulously the utopian 
schemes for a better life by its reror.mer, socialist, 
20 
pacificist, and cultist contributors. 
Moreover, Douglas was influenced greatly by his trip 
to Russia in 1927 as a member of the American Trade Union 
delegation. His thinking became more anti-capitalistic than 
ever after viewing the "People's Society" with its government 
planned economy. He was greatly impressed with the apparent 
spiritual unity among the masses and felt that the govern-
ment was protecting the laborer's rights in Russia better than 
in the capitalistic nations. He prophesied a growing future 
for the Communist experiment although he was somewhat criti-
21 
cal or the lack of political freedom or the people. 
During this period while engaged as a young professor 
at the University or Chicago, Douglas patterned his liberal 
thinking into the ror.m of a perfect economic society. His 
radical views espoused an equitable system of distribution, 
a wage seale that was knotted to the ever-swinging cost-of-
living, and an alert government that would move in upon any 
business that became too large and break it into segments. 
Douglas was so obsessed with his theories that he would air 
them before any group, no matter how small, that would 
22 
listen to his opinions. 
20 Smi.th, loc. cit., P• 29. 
21 Allen, £E• cit., PP• 188-189. 
22 "Making of a Maverick," 1oc. cit., p. 17. 
In the Presidential Election or 1928 like many other 
liberals of the era, Douglas voted for Norman Thomas, candi-
date of the Socialist Party. He would not become a member 
of the Party, however, since he could not subscribe to the 
socialist theory of the inevitability of the class struggle. 
Yet he was an ardent advocate of many socialistic ideas 
during the 1920 1s, such as unemployment insurance, state 
assistance to working mothers, social security, which have 
since become accepted as proper functions of our governmental 
economic policy by both the Republican and Democratic 
23 
Parties. 
In 1932 Douglas pushed his program of political 
reform to its most radical stage by castigating both old 
American political parties and proposing the ror.mation of a 
24 Third Party. He wrote vehemently about the political 
corruption and Wall Street interests immersed in both old 
parties' leadership. He decried against the Republican 
Party for its lack of progressiveness and its interest in 
protecting the moneyed class; he exposed the leaders of the 
Democratic Party as corrupt Northern urban bosses inter-
twined with the wealthy interests of Raskob, its National 
25 Chairman, and the ultra-conservative Southern rebels. 
23 Morris, 1oc. cit., p. 108. 
24 Douglas, Paul H., The Coming of a New Party (New York: 
Whittlesey House, 1932~. 
25 ~.,pp. 171-193. 
15 
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It is significant to note that Douglas is to-day one of the 
leading members of the Democratic Party and is ever haunted 
by his denouncement of the Party in The Coming of a New 
Party. 
Douglas set forth his proposal to for.m a Third Party 
to be made up of farmers~ laborers~ progressives of the 
middle class~ and socialists. These groups must ally to 
espouse the will of the common man for economic security and 
political freedom for the many, not the few; and to east 
aside the corrupt and moneyed interests of the decaying old 
Parties. He stated that "liberals~ laborers and farmers 
need to build up a solid political organization rooted in 
26 
integrity and principle, which can stand by itself." 
G. War Clouds in Europe 
In 1935 Douglas and his wife traveled to Europe to 
tour the Continent. This journey was very significant in 1 
his ideological development inasmuch as he was able to I 
compare the growing doctrines of fascism in Italy and Germany ! 
with the principles of democracy. 
I 
In Siena, Italy, November, 1935, Douglas was haunted 
by the "menace of war" and stated that, "Perhaps there never 
was a time when the creative aspects of life were more 
27 
widely menaced by these darker forces than now. 11 
26 Douglas, The Coming of a New Party, P• 172. 
He was 
27 Douglas, Paul H., Social Securitt in the United States 
(New York: Whittlesey ~ouse~ 1936 , p. viii. 
16 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I~ 
awed by the tremendous military machines being erected by 
Hitler and Mussolini and feared that fascism might be able 
to subdU$ western democracy through sheer weight of arms. 
Douglas had always struggled with his pacifistic 
ideas which had forced h1m to remain aloof from World War I. 
However, pacifism was smashed for Douglas when he stood 
beneath Mussolini 1 s window in the Palazzo Venezia in 1935 
and heard the dictator exhort his countrymen to attack the 
28 
small country of Ethiopia for the glory of fascism. 
The fascist terror influenced Douglas' thinking 
tremendously when he returned to the United States. He 
observed that President Franklin D. Roosevelt was attempting 
to awaken the country to the fascist threat and to strengthJ( 
our foreign policy. Too, he noted that President Roosevelt's ! 
"New Deal" economic program was granting the connnon man 
some security at home and trying to 11ft the workers from 
their position of poverty and instability. Douglas then 
decided that perhaps a Third Party was not a prerequisite 
for the uplifting of the common man, and that the Democratic !I 
Party under President Roosevelt was using a progressive I 
approach to combat our economic cancers. Thus, the liberal 
thinker curbed some of his radical plans and ideas and 
29 joined the Democratic Party which three years before he 
28 "Making of a Maverick," loc. cit., p. 17. 
29 Morris, lee. cit., p. 109. 
17 
had branded as politically corrupt. The menace of fascism 
' 
and the low-hanging war clouds were influential in changing 
Douglas from a radical political and economic theorist into 
a more practical liberal thinker. 
H. The Fifth Ward of Chicago 
The Fifth Ward 1n the City of Chicago has attained 
in his writing of many distinguished scholarly economic 
works, a.nd in his work as consultant on social security, 
unemployment, and labor problems. However, in 1939 a group 
of friends had him nominated as an Independent candidate 
30 for Alderman from the Fifth Ward. Suddenly the college 
professor was precipitated from his Ivory Tower into the 
rough maelstrom of the political arena. Curiously Demo-
cratic Boss and Mayor Ed Kelly supported Douglas as he was 
30 Steen, Julian J., "Douglas of Illinois," The Nation, 
166:127, January 31, 1948. 
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greatly tmpressed with Douglas' educational stature, so 
unlike his own, and since he was in need of a liberal to 
attract the negro and labor votes to his powerful machine. 
Douglas was elected as Alderman to the City Council by an 
overwhelming majority. 31 
Douglas could muster the support of only one other 
Alderman in the Council and, thus, was usually outvoted by 
forty-eight to two on any progressive legislation he might 
propose. However, he made an important contribution to 
the City of Chicago as Alderman by forging a small inde-
pendent bloc in the Council and by inspiring a portion of 
the cynical urbanites to participate in the municipal 
elections. More significantly, he brought home to the 
people of Chicago the wretched conditions existing within 
the metropolis: the inadequate allowances granted for un-
employment insurance, the political graft existing 1n the 
school system, the disease-infested slums inhabited by 
the Negroes. 32 
The excitement of political life stimulated Douglas 
greatly although he was somewhat dismayed by the many dis-
honorable rough-and-tumble tactics used by the professional 
politicians. He was an odd figure 1n the Chicago political 
factory since his belief 1n ~uakerism would not allow htm 
31 Smith, loc. cit., p. 30. 
32 Steen, loc. cit., p. 127. 
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to abuse his tormentors no matter how vituperative their 
jibes against htm became. Yet the hard knocks and pressure 
of politics were stimulating to him; he thought he might 
better succor his fellow man by propagating social legis-
lation 1n lawmaking bodies than by writing scholarly works 
from the calm of his University office. 
I. World War II 
The outbreak of World War II afforded Paul Douglas 
an, opportunity to clear his record of pacifism in World 
War I from his conscience. Now, in 1942, fifty years of 
age and hampered by faulty eyesight and poor teeth, he did 
not hesitate for one moment and prevailed upon his friend, 
Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, to have him admitted to 
the Marine Corps as a private. His philosophy of life 
insisted that he himself should perform whatever acts he 
33 
thought others should do. 
The over-age professor was thought of as some sort 
of an eccentric in his fatigue uniform at Parris Island, 
but he survived the rigorous and demanding physical combat 
training of Boot Camp and requested overseas duty. He 
joined the First Division of Marines at New Britain and 
then proceeded to the Russell Islands where he became 
Adjutant with the rank of Captain. He insisted upon going 
33 Morris, loc. cit., p. 110. 
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along with .his unit for the assault of Peleliu and fought 
with such courage that he was awarded the Bronze Star for 
bravery. Advanced to the rank of Major , he volunteered 
for stretcher bearer or ammunition carrier duty to enable 
h1m to take part in the invasion of Okinawa in M~ of 1945. 
The former pacifist participated as a Private first class 
in the hill-hopping fight against the Japs. and his left 
arm was nearly sev-ered below his elbow in the fierce 
battle.34 
As a result of his military experience Douglas under-
went five operations during a fourteen months hospital 
confinement. 35 However, after his discharge as a decorated 
Lieutenant Colonel, he returned to Chicago with a greater 
respect for himself as a man. The twinges of concern that 
had haunted his conscience from his World War I inactivity 
were cleansed from his soul. He had attained a new satis-
faction within himself for having performed a righteous 
duty alongside of his fellow men. 
J. The United States Senate Elections of 1948 
While he was engaged in military service, Mrs. Emily 
Douglas. his second wife and daughter of sculptor Laredo 
Taft, received the assistance of Colonel Jake Arvay, Cook 
34 Morris, loc. cit., p. 110. 
35 Strout, Richard L., "Paul Douglas: Senator with Ideas," 
New Republic, 121:14, September 5, 1949. 
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County Democratic Boss, and was elected to Congress as 
Representative-at-large from Illinois. She suffered a re-
election defeat 1n the wake of the Republican landslide of 
~6 
1946."' 
Then when Douglas returned to Chicago, he was extreme-
ly anxious to get into politics rather than to devote his 
energies again to teaching and economic research. The timing 
of his decision to enter political life in a major position 
happened to be right since Colonel Arvay, the successor to 
Boss Kelly, had decided that the sick, Unsuccessful Demo-
cratic Party in Illinois needed liberal candidates to drag 
. 37 
it out of its doldrums. Douglas had wa~ted to seek the 
gubernatorial nomination, but Arvay convinced him that be 
should seek the Senate seat. 
Douglas as the Democratic Party's nominee for the 
United States Senate from Illinois was confronted with a 
seemingly hopeless task of defeating the o~d Republican 
favorite Senator "Curly" Brooks, a protege of McCormick's 
Chicago Tribune and e.n isolationist. Overflowing with con-
fidence, vitality, and his love for people, Douglas was 
determined to stump the state to overthrow the well-
entrenched Brooks. In a station-wagon jeep he traveled 
throughout Illinois making over one thousand speeches to 
36 Morris, loc. cit., p. 110. 
37 Smith, loc. cit., p. 30. 
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small or large groups of people in every rural or urban 
area in the state. In his campaign, Douglas shed his pro-
fessorial robes and talked to the people in their own 
language; he ferreted out anyone who would listen to htm 
and explained his political views in a simple~ down-to-earth 
manner. When Brooks called Douglas irresponsible and re-
fused to debate with h1m, the latter placed an empty chair 
on the platform and addressed 1t as Senator Brooks, much to 
the delight of the audience. Douglas conducted an energetic, 
I 
earthy and colorful campaign that rewarded him with a tre- 1 
mendous victory over Brooks by more than 400~000 votes. 38 
Thus 1n 1948 Douglas came to the fork in the road of 
his career and turned away from the path of economic 
scholarly pursuits to the way of national politics. His 
future destiny would be shaped by his acts and deeds in the 
arena of Congress rather than by his writings and teachings 
on economic problems and theory. He had the potential of a 
great leader because he entered the political scene with 
the reputation of a distinguished economist, a thorough-
going liberal, and a figure of great integrity and humility. 
38 Smith, loc. cit., p. 31. 
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Chapter III 
THE GROWTH OF THE ECONOMIST, PAUL HOWARD DOUGLAS 
Whether Paul Howard Douglas ever will return to his 
work in economies is questionable since he has succeeded in 
becoming an important actor on the American political stage. 
However, for more than thirty years from the time he began 
his teaching as an instructor at the University of Illinois 
in 1916 until he was given a leave of absence from the 
University of Chicago in 1948 to enter the United States 
Senate, his main preoc_cupation was in the field of economics. 
During those years Douglas subjected himself to an oppressive 
program of unceasing work in teaching, writing and lecturing 
on labor, unemployment, business cycles, wages, and social 
security. Moreover, throughout that period he worked on 
numerous occasions as an economic advisor to both state 
agencies and the federal government. 
This chapter will attempt to lend insight into 
li 
Douglas 1 development from a young instructor to his posit ion 
1
j 
of highest achievement in economics as President of the Amer~ 
can Economic Association. He toiled incessantly to present 
his beliefs to the world and to accelerate the progress of 
economics toward a scientific maturity. 
24 
\ A. Doctorate Dissertation at Columbia University, 1921 
After graduating from Bowdoin College in 1913, Douglas 
set out immediately to increase his knowledge of economics, 
for he had determined to make that subject the major part of 
his life's work. He enrolled at Columbia University and 
received his Master of Arts degree from that institution two 
years later. He then moved to Cambridge and studied as a 
graduate student at Harvard University during the 1915-+916 
l 
academic year. 
The young economist commenced his teaching career 
when he received his first appointment as an instructor in 
economics at the University of Illinois 1n 1916. The follow-
! 
ing year he transferred to Reed College in Portland, Oregon, 
2 to serve as an instructor and associate professor. After 
serving as a labor disputes adjustor with the Emergency 
Fleet Corporation in the war years of 1918-1919, Douglas re-
entered the teaching profession as an associate professor at 
the University of Washington. The next year the University 
of Chicago offered him the position of assistant professor 
of industrial relations, and he accepted that post to begin 
his long-standing association with that 1nst1tut1on.3 
l Current Biography, 1949 (New York: H. W. Wilson Co., 
1950), p. 166. 
2 ~-
3 Ibid., p. 167 
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During these early years of teaching, Douglas had 
been doing research for his doctoral dissertation. In 1921 
he finally completed his work and was awarded his Doctor of 
Philosophy degree from Columbia University. This work, 
4 American Apprenticeship and Industrial Education, was pub-
lished that same year and proved to be his first major con-
tribution in the field or economies. 
In this work Douglas attempted to trace the history 
of the system of apprenticeship, the process of teaching a 
minor a trade by having him work wi th one engaged in the 
trade, from its birth at the dawn of civilization to the 
modern era. Through this surv~ he concluded that appren-
ticeship was decaying because of "the inevitable speciali-
zation of the machine era and by the individualistic conduct 
u5 of industry •••• Douglas expos ed the unfortunate plight 
of the average child in the Uni ted States: he was forced to 
leave school at an early age and then become a drifter from 
one job to another, from one industry to another, always 
remaining unskilled and int'lictad with the hardships of 
industrial instability. The unprotected child fell into the 
class of the unskilled workman when he reached maturity and 
thus was subject to the miseries of poverty. Douglas said 
4 Douglas, Paul H., American Apprenticeship and Industrial 
Education (New York: Columbia University, Longmans, 
Green & Co., Agents, 1921). 
5 ~., p. 84. 
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that: 
Now it was the function of apprenticeship 
to protect this adolescent child. It gave him. 
moral oversight and a steadiness of employment. 
It was a recognition by the state of guardian-
ship over the child. To-day with the breakdown 
of apprenticeship we allow the child to shift 
for himself. We allow him to drift into employ-
ments that are socially and individually harmfUl. 
We wash our hands of responsibility, and in 
consequence both the child and the nation suffer. 6 
Douglas concluded that since apprenticeship had been 
destroyed by the division of labor, the profit motivation, 
and the -separation of worker from employer of modern indus-
try a new program had to be devised to protect and develop 
the youth of the day. Among other remedies he advocated: 
6 
7 
9 
10 
11 
12 
1. Sixteen years of compulsory education. 7 
2. Compulsor.1 continuation schools for children 
between the ages of 16 and 18 years.8 
9 
·3. A national system of vocational ~idan18 under 
a new Federal Department of Education. 
4. The creation of training and industrial ·rela-
tions departments in industry.ll 
5. Legislation to prohibit child labor in certain 
11 Blind-Alley" trades.l2 
Douglas, American Apprenticeship and Industrial Education, I 
p. 108. 
Ibid., p. 331. 
Ibid., P• 333. 
Ibid., P• 339. 
~., P• 335. 
~., P• 334. 
27 
. I 
~ 
I 
In the past two decades social legislation has been 
passed both by the tederal and state governments to protect 
the youth of the United States. The legislatures have 
enacted compulsory school laws, and child-labor provisions 
and prohibitions to prevent industry from stagnating and 
crippling children either physically or mentally. Time has 
advanced most of Douglas' proposals into the laws of the 
land. His dissertation presented ideas for refor.ming the 
inadequacies of the vocational guidance and industrial 
education syst~m of his time which proved to be an accurate 
harbinger for the present training methods. The work pre-
sented a multiple of secondary statistical records to enhance 
his position, but was lacking somewhat in intensive original 
research on the aspects of vocational guidance which he pro-
posed. However, Douglas made an important contribution in a 
field which was badly in need of reformation; he aided in 
the eradication of the social diseases inflicting the minor 
in the modern industrial system. 
B. Intense Study of Wages: 1925-1934 
After arriving at the University of Chicago in 1920, 
Douglas became entrenched in the academic life of that 
place of learning at once. His intense and tireless industry 
and his exacting scientific approach to the problems of 
economics were recognized early at the University~ and in 
28 
I 
1923 Douglas was advanced to assistant professor. Two years 
later he became a full professor. His teaching personality 
s.eemed to develop as the years passed by: in the early 
stages he was always insecure, sober and "sad-eyed" with no 
patent sense of humor; later he became a spirited, secure 
and friendly pedagogue "with a sort of sanitary humor. n13 
In his research work in economics Douglas became 
intensely interested in the subject of wages and decided to 
study the family allowance system of wage payments. In 1925 
he published his studies on that subject in Wages and the 
Family, 14 and this work initiated a decade of indefatigable 
study by Douglas upon the subject of wages. 
Wages and the Family instantly became a much discussed 
book, and it forwarded Douglas as the leading American pro-
ponent of the Family Wage system. In the work he traced the 
development of the Family Wage system in Europe, destroyed 
the "standard" family of five as the mean of the living-wage 
principle, and advocated 11 the fixation of a minimum wage 
sufficient to support single men with added allowances for 
15 dependent wives, children, and other adults." 
Douglas followed the above work with his manuscript 
13 Smith, 1oc. £!!., p. 28. 
14 Douglas, Paul H., Wages and the Family (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1925). 
15 Ibid., P• 3. 
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on the theory of wages which was awarded the Hart, Schaffner, 
and Marx Prize of five thousand dollars in 1926 as previous-
ly reported in Chapter II (E). In the same year he became 
interested in the movement of real wages and published a 
16 paper on that subject covering the years 1895-1924. This 
study attempted to set up a new index of the cost of living, 
and then compare the relative movement of wages and earnings 
against the cost of living. 
~ 
Douglas continued his research on real wages and in 1 
17 1930 published · Real Wages in the United States : 1890-1926. 
Here through much laborious effort he had constructed a 
statistical index which allowed h~ to shed light upon the 
changes in the real income of the workers. Thus Douglas was 
able to describe more accurately than any other economist 
the material progress of the American wage-earning and 
salaried classes. The book has been described: 
In magnitude, his work is comparable to the 
labors of Hercules, while in social value, it 
far transcends the fabulous stunts performed by 
that Greek hero •••• His book must be recognized 
as the most profoundly scientific and thorough-
going study in the field of wages and incomes of 
workers which has thus far appeared.l8 
In the same year Douglas continued his above studies by 
16 Do"Q.glas, Paul H., "The Movement of Real Wages and Its 
Economic Significance," American Economic Review, 16: 
No. 1, Supplement, March 1926. 
17 Douglas, Paul H., Real Wages in the United States : 1890-
~ (Cambridge: The Houghton Mifflin Co., 1930). 
18 Meeker, Royal, in The New York Times, July 13, 1930, p.l2. 
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adding the years 1926-1928 to his work on real wages. 19 
This work described the movement of real earnings of more 
than 15 1 000,000 wage-earners in the United States for the 
1 
I 
I 
designated years and pointed up the slight decrease in real I 
earnings between 1926 and 1928. 
Douglas culminated his wor~ on wages with his most 
serious book, The Theory of Wages, which was published in 'I 
1934. The background for this great effort had been derived 
too from the Hart, Schaffner, and Marx Prize manuscript of 
1926 which had been returned to him for further development. 
Douglas had expended tremendous effort in this work which 
had over a million separate calculations ·and testings. The 
book was a prodigious attempt to present a theory of wages 
by means of inductive, quasi-mathematical, and statistical 
methods. Douglas described the work as "an attempt at an 
inductive study of both the productivity and supply curves 
of labor and capital, and from these, certain tentative 
results have been obtained which the author at least be-
20 
lieves to be important." The book made a considerable 
I 
I 
imprint upon economic thinking in the world and tended to 
enhance Douglas' reputation as one of the foremost economists! 
of the day. The well conceived work was a step forward 
19 Douglas, Paul H. and Jennison, Florence Tye, The Move-
ment of Mone and Real Earnin s in the United States, 
C The University of Chicago Press, 
20 ~., p. viii. 
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in the progress of economics towards its place as a more 
exacting social science. 
c. Attacking the Economic Problems of the Thirties 
The collapse of business in 1929 brought about great 
misery for the workers in the United States through unem-
ployment, drastic wage cuts, and other factors lowering 
their earning power. Human suffering was widespread 
out the nation. 
In 1930 Douglas accepted the appointment to organize 
and direct a new project at Swarthmore College, the Insti-
tute of Unemployment. This difficult assignment gave him 
the opportunity to attack the probl em of unemployment 
frontally and attempt to ascertain remedies for the economic 
illness in the nation. During his year's residence at 
Swarthmore College he did a huge amount of research on the 
subject and succeeded 1n compiling and analyzing the ex-
periments and experiences of most of the work done through-
out the world to stabilize employment. President Frank 
Aydelotte of Swarthmore College reported that Douglas accom-
plished the most difficult task with "success which far out-
ran the expectations of all those connected with the 
study. "21 
21 Douglas, Paul H. and Director, Aaron, The Problem of 
Unemployment (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1931}, 
p. ix. 
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Besides his important work at Swarthmore in 1930, 
Douglas was summoned by several state governments to assist 
them in ameliorating the unemployment plague~ At the re-
quest of the then Governor of New York, Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt, he served as technical advisor to the New York 
Commission on Reducing Unemployment and drafted the report 
of the Commission. He also assisted Miss Frances Perkins, 
Industrial Commissioner of New York State, in preparing for 
the Governors Conference on Unemployment called by Roose-
velt. Moreover, he acted as Secretary to the Pennsylvania 
Commission on Unemployment at Governor P1nchot's request. 
He submltted the report for that body. He was further 
called upon to draft potential unemployment insurance bills 
for the 'states of Illinois, Ohio and Michigan for allevi-
22 
ating the hardships and suffering in those areas. Thus 
in the first year of the Great Depression Douglas was 
called away from his pedagogy to aid in searching for some 
relief to the woes inflicting a great part of his country. 
He met the issue of unemployment squarely; and after sift-
ing through all previous empirical approaches to the subject 
he offered forthright plans to ameliorate the disease. I 
Douglas was forced into closer contact with public 
life with each passing year as he was appointed to member-
ship of numerous bureaucratic boards. In 1931 his home 
22 Douglas and Director, ~· cit., p. x. 
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state made him a member of the Illinois Housing Commission 
and he served on this body until 1933. With this Commission 
he advocated a lowering of the gas and electric rates and 
was instrumental in formulating the Illinois Utilities Act 
of 1933. That same year President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
appointed htm to the Consumer's Advisory Board of the 
National Recovery Administration, and Douglas served 
vigorously in that job for three years. He served Illinois 
once again by drafting both the Old Age Pension Act of 1935 
. 23 
and the Unemployment Insurance Act of 1937. His scholar-
ship in the field of unemployment protection was recognized 
in Washington in 1937 when Congress requested that he be-
come a member of the Advisory Commission to the United 
States Senate and the Social Security Board on the subject 
of the federal social security system. 24 
The decade of the Thirties had subjected American 
capitalism to its sternest test since it had created much 
disquiet among the millions of poverty-stricken workers 
throughout the country. Douglas could not remain an arm-
chair theoretician during this period of economic collapse, 
but rather he struck out against it both in his writings 
and in his public activities. He coupled his labored, 
penetrating research with his boundless vigor and set out 
23 Current Biography, p. 167. 
24 The Directory of American Scholars (Lancaster, Pa.~ 
The Service Press, 1942). 
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as a Don ~uixote to destroy the windmills that were pumping 
distress into the economic way-of-life. 
D. The Turbulent Nineteen-Forties 
The decade commencing with the year 1940 was a most 
turbulent and hectic one for Paul H. Douglas. War activi-
ties and political life pushed his economic concentrations 
in the background to a degree; yet during this ttme span 
he gained an American economist's greatest reward. 
While teaching at the University of Chicago 1n 1942, 
Douglas decided to make a bid for the Democratic Party's 
nomination as United States Senator. He made a vigorous 
campaign but was beaten by the powerful Kelly-Nash machine, 
the bosses of Chicago's politics. 25 Immediately after 
this political defeat, the Professor enlisted in the Marine 
Corps and commenced upon his military career. His heroism 
and achievements for the flag of his country were recorded 
in Chapter II. 
In 1946 after recovering from his battle wounds, 
Douglas served as a Presidential advisor for a short time 
in Washington and then returned to the University of Chicago 
and regained his status as Professor of Industrial Rela-
tiona. 
On January 25, 1947, he received the highest honor 
25 Smith, loc. cit., p. 30. 
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awarded to an economist in the United States when he was 
elected President of the American Economic Association, an 
organi zation dedicated to "the encouragement of economic 
research, the issue of publications on economic subjects, 
and the encouragement of perfect freedom of economic dis-
26 
cussion." As President of this organization Douglas 
joined hands with former Presidents as John B. Clark (1894-
95), Frank w. Taussig (1904-05), John R. Commons (1917), 
Wesley C. Mitchell {1924), John M. Clark (1935) and others, 
great names in the world of economics. 
Douglas left the teaching profession in 1948 when, 
after a grass-roots campaign throughout the State of Illi-
nois, he was elected to the United States Senate. Since 
his arrival in Washington, the "freshman Senator" has become 
one of the most outstanding and controversial members of 
that august body, and his fame has spread throughout the 
land. The hybrid character of an intellectual and poli-
tieian, a ~uaker and soldier, a reformer and compromiser, 
has cast Douglas as a rare being on the national scene. 
26 Bell, James Washington, Seer. in The American Economic 
Review, Vol. 38, Preface, May 1948. 
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Chapter IV 
THE UNEMPLOYMENT QUESTION 
Thus far in the world of medical history physicians 
have been unable to cure a malignant cancer, and the word 
cancer has become a horrendous one for 811 mankind. 
Germanely unemployment has periodically spread misery, want, 
and frustration about for the workingman and has succeeded 
in becoming the most pressing domestic problem of our ttme. 
Looking backward a score of years to my grammar 
school days in New York City there have been forged upon 
my memory m~y scenes of suffering and degradation that I 
witnessed there during the Great Depression. Edging out 
on the banks of the Hudson River along fashionable River-
side Drive there were thousands of ramshackle paper and 
stick huts in which the homeless resided in squalor. ~ueues 
could be seen every few blocks shivering in the cold before 
a Soup Kitchen. Children came to school in tattered shirts 
and pants and sole-flapping shoes. New York and the rest 
of the great United States was inflicted by a situation 
that seemed to tear the heart out of millions of frustrated, 
forlorn and idle Americans for a decade. 
Sir William H. Beveridge has written~ 
Unemployment is often called a disease of 
society. I an inclined to think that one is 
nearer the truth 1f one speaks of it as a 
37 
symptom. Unemployment is l ike a headache or a 
high temperature--unpleasant and exhausting but 
not carrying in itself an explanation of its 
cause. A high temperature may be got by catch-
ing malaria or by breaking one's leg or by eat-
ing too much; it may mean that one has something 
wrong with one's appendix or lungs or teeth~ that 
one is in the thick of a bad cold or is sickening 
for cholera. Until one finds -out which of these 
and many other possible causes is at work, one 
will not have gone far in finding a cure simply 
by knowing how many degrees of fever one has. 
The clinical thermometer is an indispensable 
but limited instrument.l 
Douglas contributed to the study of the unemployment problem 
in his writings as he attempted to measure more accurately 
the extent of the malady, to consolidate past works in the 
field, to spell out the various causes and effects. and to 
suggest measures which would aid in the prevention or 
tempering of the great social problem. He was helpful in 
organizing the very complex subject in a more uniform 
pattern so that more definite results could be achieved in 
counteracting the depression phenomenon. It was typical of 
the character of the man that he should grapple vigorously 
with the most pressing problem of his times: in the early 
Thirties he attacked the business decay and the unemployment 
question; to-day in the Senate arena he has come to grips 
with the communistic peril and Soviet Russian imperialism. 
l Beveridge, Sir William H., Causes and Cures of Unemploy-
ment (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1931), p. 1. 
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A. Approach to the Unemployment Question 
As both an economist and a reformer Douglas was 
determined to address his attention to the severe economic 
crises that were rocking the United States in 1930. His 
appointment as Director of the Swarthmore Unemployment Study 
was the opportunity he needed to direct all his energy 
toward analyzing the chaotic conditions that engulfed the 
nation. Thus Douglas was able to produce a most searching 
l a 
treatise, The Problem of Unemployment, that has become one 
of the most important works in the field of unemployment 
analysis and has contributed much to the contemporary method 
of handling the problem. 
Initially Douglas attempted to present a picture of 
the extent and cost of unemployment in the United States. 
He pointed up the deficiencies in the past methods of 
measurement of unemployment which were based on rough esti-
mates since the fundamental statistics necessary to compile 
accurate figures were not available. He worked with the 
Census of Unemployment, statistics derived from unemployment 
insurance in foreign countries, public employment office 
data, trade-union statistics, and a method of subtracting 
the estimated numbers employed from the probable labor suppl·y 
to compile an index by Which to measure the yearly movement 
2 
of the unemployment figures. It was unfortunate that raw 
la Douglas and Director. 
2 Douglas, Real Wages in the United States, 1890-1926, 
PP• 430-449. 
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materials for deriving his statistics were not available on 
a more accurate level as those available in the present day 
3 offered in the Monthly Report on the Labor Force since it 
led to many inaccuracies in his computations. Although 
aware of the limitations of his unemployment index, Douglas 
asserted that by comparing it with whatever Census statistics 
were available it showed a strong degree of accuracy and was 
"the closest approximation to the truth which it is at 
4 present possible to frame." Through the statistics he 
generalized that: (1) in the years 1897-1926 the unemploy-
ment average in manufacturing, transportation, mining and 
construction was lo%; (2) 6% of (1) was a minimum of unem-
ployment caused by seasonal, chronic, and sickness reasons; 
(3) in the industries analyzed the volume of unemployment 
neither tended to increase or diminish; (4) a sharp distinc-
5 
tion must be made between major and minor business cycles. 
Although Douglas made an honest attempt to determine 
the proper yardstick by which to measure the problem through 
strenuous toil with the sparse raw data available, he was 
unable to present an exact definition of the word, unemploy-
ment. He parried the derinition about but was unable to 
3 U. s. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
Monthly Report on the Labor Force. 
4 Douglas and Director, ~· cit., P• 32. 
5 ~., PP• 32-33. 
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o~~er a de~inition that could include all the complexities 
o~ the problem, such as: the status o~ idle aged people, 0~ 
youths or married women who have never been a part o~ the 
labor ~orce but begin to look ~or jobs, o~ workers unwilling 
to work at a lowered wage, o~ part-time workers, of striking 
workers. 
In his approach to the American unemployment question 
Douglas also analyzed the picture in several ~oreign coun-
tries in an e~fort to · compare the unemployment ~luctuations 
between the foreign group and the United States. In his re- 1 
search he discovered that foreign statistics were inadequate, 
as in the United States, to present an accurate comparison. 
Through the use o~ trade union reports alone, except ~or the 
decidedly more accurate unemployment insurance statistics in 
Great Britain since 1912, he ~ormed percentages of unemploy-
ment ~or Germany, Great Britain, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, 
6 Canada, and Australia from 1904-1930. He explained the ~act 
that Great Britain's average volume of unemployment was only 
one hal~ that of the United States during the pre-war years 
and only slightly more during its worst period by: (1) the 
much greater ,irregularity of consumer demand in the United 
States caused by ~ar greater weather differences in this 
country than in Great Britain; (2) the greater stress upon 
style and fashion in the United States causing greater 
6 Douglas and Director, ££• £!i., pp. 34-47. 
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irregularity of employment; (3) larger population shifts in 
the United States causing temporary unemployment conditions; 
(4 ) the much larger growth of industrial progress in the 
7 
United States: during 1907-1924 Great Britain's increase 
of production was 23% compared with the United States' so% 
8 
and increased output per worker was 4% against 45%. Doug-
las reasoned that France's comparatively low volume of un-
employment in comparison to the United States was because 
of: (1) the stimulating effec t to business of the rising 
price level in France from 1908 to 1927; (2} the post-war 
rebuilding program financed by German reparations; (3) the 
nationally-planned immigration policy which only permitted 
entrance to immigrants with job off ers. 9 In his analysis 
of Russia's extraordinary falling volume of unemployment 
during the first year of the Great Depression, 1929-1930, 
while other nations' volume was r ising Douglas justified 
this phenomenon as follows: (1) an increasing rate of in-
dustrial production through the Five-Year Plan; (2) the 
advantage of a planned economy over a laissez-faire one in 
the utilization of productive capacity to meet slackening 
7 Douglas and Director, QE• cit., PP• 48-53. 
8 Douglas, P. H. and Tolles, N. A., 11A Measurement of 
British Industrial Production," Journal of Political 
Economy, 38:1-28, February, 1930; Douglas, Real Wages, 
p. 547. 
9 Douglas and Director, ££• cit., PP• 57-60. 
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demand; (3) the stabilization of the Russian price 1eve1.10 
A criticism of Douglas' above approach to Europe's 
unemployment problem would suggest that his adjudgement of 
the situation was a cursory one and not too deep an analysis 
of the problem. He worked almost completely with somewhat 
biased trade union reports to gain his index of unemployment 
and thus was open to a possible wide margin of error. In 
his analysis of Great Britain, France, and Russia he tended 
to present conclusions without a full substantiation of the 
merit of these statements. 
In attacking the question of unemployment Douglas 
was realistic in attempting to derive a standard by which he 
could determine the true extent of the economic malady. 
Although the accuracy of his statistical estimates was to 
be doubted, he establiShed a more complete basis than had 
been previously promulgated by which to stu~ both the 
causes and potential remedies to the problem. As will be 
seen in later sections however, his major contribution to 
the subject was not in his statistical introduction to the 
question of unemployment but in his proposals for lightening 
the burden of employment maladjustments. 
B. Seasonal Unemployment 
Of the three major causes of unemployment, seasonal, 
technological and cyclical unemployment, Douglas considered 
10 Douglas and Director, 2£• cit., PP• 60-63. 
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seasonal unemployment as the least important factor in the 
causation of joblessness. Like Beveridge he thought of this 
type of unemployment as: 
Seasonal fluctuation implies a falling off1 in 
slack months, of the demand for labour. It is 
a cause of lack of employment entirely inde-
pendent of the wishes and character of the indi-
vidual workman, or, in general. of the individual 
employer. It does not 1 however, necessafily or 
indeed commonly involve acute distress. 1 
This type of unemployment, a product of the seasons 
of tr~ year, caused much displacement of personnel in many 
industries annually. Douglas estimated that seasonal flue-
tuations in the manufacturing. construction, and trade in-
12 
dustries was at a yearly average of 6%. However, this 
estimate would be lessened if the more stable public utility, 
finance and domestic service groups were added to the above 
industries. 13 
Douglas paid little attention to the causation of 
seasonal fluctuations and merely mentioned weather and 
styling as being the factors involved. He immediately 
entangled himself in the measurement of tbe variations with-
out grappling with the core of the issue, the causes. Be-
sides climatic conditions and fashion, another important 
cause has been social habits which have become ingrained in 
11 
12 
13 
Beveridge, w. H., Unemployment: A Problem of Industry 
(1909 and 1930), (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1930), 
p. 34. 
Douglas and Director, 2£• ~., P• 84. 
Ibid. 
14 the li~e o~ the people. Social habits such as a customary 
time to move ~rom one residence to another as in the early 
~all, the Christmas gi~t-giving period, the customary dates 
~or woolen sales have influenced the labor turnover annually. 
Douglas' estimated ~igure o~ 6% o~ the workers idle 
through seasonal variations should be quali~ied by ~actors 
which have tended to minimize the extent of that figure. A 
6% annual seasonal unemployment in our labor force to-day of 
over 60,000,000 would mean unemployment for more than 
3,600,000 workers. Many workers were not discharged but had 
the number o~ days worked during the year reduced. Also 
workers discharged from an industry in a slow period may 
~ind employment in a dif~erent industry which may be in its 
15 
active season of production. Thus many variable condi-
tions shoul d be mentioned to present as accurate a presenta- 1 
tion of seasonal unemployment as possible in that nebulous 
~ield. The worker who has not been discharged, but just 
temporarily laid of~, will not bear the mental distress and 
psychological despair of the totally unemployed one. The 
regularity of seasonal fluctuations in the various indus-
tries also may provide another unusual ractor to this un-
employment question since it may be more easily overcome 
than other unemployment causations by prior planning for 
14 Beveridge, ££• cit., pp. 33-34. 
15 Ibid., pp. 34-35. 
the known coming dislocation. Thus season unemployment is 
nowhere near as serious as cyclical since it is firmly en-
closed by the boundaries of one year whereas cyclical vari-
ations are indefinite in length and in proportion. 
To combat seasonal fluctuations Douglas pointed out 
that it was necessary for industry to attempt to discover 
means for keeping production at a stable unifor.m level 
throughout the year. The Sherwin-Williams Company had used 
advertising to change consumer buying habits in paints to a 
more steady basis; the American Radiator Company had offered . 
price concessions to its dealers for off-season buying; the 
Packard Motor Car Company had used forecasting and advanced 
planning to set up a _sales figure and followed it with a 
steady monthly production to meet the estimate; the Dennison 
Manufacturing Company had diversified their output from the 
original manufacture of jewelry boxes for Christmas sales 
to a multiple number of paper products utilized throughout 
the year; the Delaware Hudson Railway had maintained a con-
16 
stant number of workers on a flexible hourly scale. He 
emphasized, however, that in the main such stabilizing 
measures c ould only be attempted by the major corporations 
since off-season advertising, price discounts, budgetary 
planning, warehousing and interest charges for carrying 
goods for longer periods of time were all very costly 
16 Douglas and Director, QE• cit., pp. 85-108. 
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considerations. However such regularization of sales and 
production would render profitable savings if successfUl by 
eliminating the heavy costs of training new employees, lower-
ing fixed overhead costs, paying workers on a lower wage 
17 
scale, and by insuring increased production per worker. 
In this way Douglas contributed greatly to the study 
of this seasonal unemployment question by compiling and 
presenting the empirical approaches of hundreds of corpora-
tions in their attempt to stabilize employment and produc-
tion. His research and presentation illuminated the path 
for a further study for offsetting the seasonal fluctuations 
nurtured by weather or custom. The recording of the practi-
cal methods used by industry to eliminate yearly fluctuations 
brought the problem out of the realm of theory in which it 
had been previously hidden into the daily economic battle-
ground. 
Both Douglas and Beveridge hinted at the remedy of 
the guaranteed annual wage to stabilize employment, but 
neither spelled out this excellent solution. Beveridge 
pointed up this point as follows: 
Ultimately, therefore, seasonal fluctuation 
becomes a question not of unemployment but of 
wages. From an economic point of view no indus-
try is self-supporting unless it pays wages 
sufficient to keep men, not only while they are 
at work, but also while they must stand idle 
and in reserve. Where in any occupation seasonal 
17 Douglas and Director, QE• cit., PP• 109-113. 
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~luctuation year a~ter year brings round acute 
distress~ that occupation must be judged as one 
in which wages are too low or ill-spent~ because 
they do not average out to a surficiency ~or the 
slack months as well as ~or the busy ones. It 
is from this point o~ view that the problem must 
be regarded. It is upon this basis that its 
treatment must be attempted.l8 
C. Technological Unemployment 
The displacement o~ men by machines or by new labor-
saving techniques was an important problem in Douglas' 
thinking on unemployment. The Industrial Revolution and 
the progressive innovations of new productive labor-saving 
processes through the past two centuries had constantly 
brought the ~ear o~ permanent unemployment to the minds of 
the working masses. The ~ear of labor-saving machinery 
reached its peak in the ~or.m o~ technocracy in the opening 
stages of the decade of 1930 when the vision o~ bolt-and-
nut monsters performing the workload of men to bring employ-
ment 11as close to zero as possible" was projected be~ore 
19 
the nation. Would mechanical ~arm machinery such as 
cotton pickers~ bottling mechanisms~ the "electric eye," 
linotype equipment and other scientific man-eliminating 
devices ultimately destroy the need for manpower and usher 
in an era of fixed joblessness? 
18 Beveridge, 2£• cit.~ P• 37. 
19 Scott, Howard, "Technocracy Smashes the Price System~" 
Harper's Magazine, 166 :135-6, January, 193·3. 
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Douglas followed the traditional theory in analyzing 
this problem and contended that "permanent technological 
20 
unemployment is an impossibility." In three diff'erent 
21 
works on the above thesis Douglas set f'orth the following 
analysis: 
(1) In the situation where the elasticity of demand may 
be equal to unity technological improvements will lower pro-
duction costs which will in turn be reflected in a price 
reduction. Consumer demand will rise in the same proportion 
as the price reduction and thereby force increased produc-
tion. The added production will necessitate the maintenance 
of' labor, and therefore, will not cause technological un-
employment. 
(2) If' labor-saving machinery enter an industry in which 
a product has a highly elastic demand, a lower cost of' pro-
duction will bring about a price reduction; but the demand 
will rise at a greater proportion than that by which the 
price was lowered. The innovation will require added workers, 
rather than a displacement, in that industry to meet the 
increased demand. 
(3) Where the demand for a product may be inelastic, the 
20 Douglas, Paul H. 1 "Machinery and Unemployment, tt 
Current History, 33:44, October, 1930. 
21 Ibid., PP• 42-46. 
Douglas and Director, ££• cit., pp. 125-142. 
Douglas, Paul H., "Technological Unemployment, 11 The Ameri-
can Federationist, 37:923-950, August, 1930. 
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new machinery will lower the cost of production and there-
after the price of the goods. In this consideration although 
demand will not increase, the lowered price will permit the 
consumer to procure the same amount of the goods with a 
smaller quantity of money, thus allowing consumer saving. 
Thus while employment will drop in this industry, the saving 
will stimulate consumer demand for other goods and increase 
employment in other fields as production of other goods 
rises. Thus temporarily unemployed workers will be absorbed 
in industries with expanded production. 
(4) Unlike the above arguments mirrored in a system of 
free competitive enterprise, technological improvements may 
cause a different relationship in a monopolistic industry. 
Here the entrepreneur may maintain the price of the product 
even under a condition of lowered productive costs to obtain 
a higher yield of profits. Then the added profits would be 
reinvested for new capital goods which will increase the 
demand for workers in the heavy goods industries to balance 
the number of men forced out of the above industry. 
Douglas' theory of the impossibility of technological 
unemployment seems to be too loose an analysis of the ~­
portant problem. The proposals would seem to be valid in a 
simple industrial society in which changes in demand and in 
employment could easily be traceable. However, in the modern 
industrial society enmeshed with great complexities of 
50 
businesses, markets and products the simplicity of the 
effects of the interchange of men and machinery may not be 
a truism. The laissez-faire society has been replaced by 
one of monopolistic-competition which may not allow produc-
tion and demand to add employment when labor-saving tech-
niques are innovated. In the strongly elastic demand situ-
ation, the effectiveness of new machinery may cause such a 
tremendous saving of labor per item of output that no matter 
how great the added demand for the goods may be only a small 
number of maintenance workers would be needed to run the 
equipment. The soft-drink bottling and dry cereal packing 
plants would be in point in this regard since a few men can 
operate the machinery twenty-four hours a day if necessary 
to meet increased demand. Consumer savings in the case of 
inelastic demand may not be spent in procuring other 
products; rather hoarding may occur. The hoarding of savings 
would not increase the demand for other goods and services 
and thus would not relocate a displacement of workers in the 
increased activity of other industries. A monopolistic 
situation in which higher profits were realized from labor-
saving devices might or again might not result in the re-
investment of added profits in capital goods. If the 
profits gained from a reduction in the labor force were not 
reinvested to increase the production of other goods, then 
technological unemployment would definitely follow. 
Although Douglas' theory of the impossibility of 
51 
technological unemployment had a multitude of nebulous 
aspects, there were many factors that tend to substantiate 
his analysis. If labor-saving _machinery and devices were 
to have caused permanent displacement of workers, then the 
innovations in industry since the Industrial Revolution 
should have created a tremendous segment of permanently 
unemployed -workers through the years. Douglas' own index 
of unemployment for 1890-1926 revealed that 11 the percentage 
of unemployment was approximately the same for the period 
1920-1926 as it has been on the average during the three 
22 
previous decades." The years 1920-1926 had seen great 
technological advances in the field of production.Unemploy-
ment was not a serious menace to the economy during the 
first three decades of the twentieth century; rather techno-
logical innovations seemed to bring forth an increase in 
employment. The inventions of new machinery created new 
demands for capital goods which added to employment in the 
heavy industry field. Moreover with many technological 
changes new products were born to increase the demand for 
labor. Slichter noted: "Indeed from the standpoint of 
maintaining employment, technological changes are likely to 
come too slowly rather than too rapidly in the ~ediate 
23 future. 11 
22 Douglas and Director, ~· £!i., P• 123. 
23 Slichter, Swnner., "Implications of the Shorter Hour Move-
ment, 11 Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, 
15-70,71, January, 1934. 
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Table I 
Unemployment in Manufacturing, Transportation, 
Building Trades, and Mining, 1897-192624 
Year Percentage Unemployed 
1897 18.0 
1898 16.9 
1899 10.5 
1900 10.0 
1901 7.5 
1902 6.8 
1903 7.0 
1904 10.1 
1905 6.7 
1906 5.9 
1907 6.9 
1908 16.4 
1909 8.9 
1910 7.2 
1911 9.4 
1912 7.0 
1913 8.2 
1914 16.4 
1915 15.5 
1916 6.3 
1917 6.0 
1918 5.5 
1919 6.9 
1920 7.2 
1921 23.1 
1922 18.3 
1923 7.9 
1924 12.0 
1925 8.9 
1926 7.5 
24 Douglas and Director, ££• cit., P• 28. 
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Finally, both Hansen and Beveridge corroborated 
Douglas' premise by statistically showing that the total 
reward to the workers had increased sharply during the 
progress of industrial invention. Beveridge proved that 
in the period of 1878-1907 wages in Great Britain had been 
risL~g while prices were falling; therefore an increase in 
the real wages of workers while labor-saving devices were 
25 being introduced. Similarly Hansen estimated that in 
1920 the real wages of the laborforce in the United States 
were three and one-half times greater than they were a 
26 
century before. 
Over a long time span in which the impact of techno-
logical changes have been earth-shaking and populations 
have been increasing, there has not been a cumulative in-
creasing group of permanently unemployed workers. The 
substitution of wireless for the pony express, the automobile 
for the horse-drawn coach, electricity for manpower, giant 
earth movers for the pick and shovel, power machinery for 
handwork has increased the demand for labor rather than 
stimulated a reverse condition. 
Douglas tempered the theory of the impossibility of 
permanent technological unemployment somewhat by admitting 
that industrial changes caused a serious transitional 
25 Beveridge, ££• cit., P• 9. 
26 Hansen, Alvin, "Factors Affecting the Trend of Real 
Wages," The American Economic Review, 15:27-42, 
March, 1925. 
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ten years 
Table II 
Rates of Money Wages and Prices, 1878-1907 
(1900 = l00)26a 
Wages 
Coal- Engineer- Agricul- Mean of 
Building Mining ing Textile ture five groups 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1878-1887 85.45 63.66 89.32 91.54 91.42 84.28 
1888-1897 89.65 76.54 93.56 95.15 92.96 89.57 
1898-1907 99.80 87.14 100.30 101.10 100.85 97.83 
26a Beverid~, Unemployment (1909-1930), p. 9. 
Prices 
(wholesale) 
7 
119.5 
98 . 3 
97.8 
C11 
C11 
unemployment problem. Laborers would not be immediately 
absorbed into expanding industries from contracting ones; 
increased consumer demand caused by price reduction of a 
product would not be an instantaneous operation~ but rather 
a delayed one; a change of residence or occupation would be 
imperative after sweeping industrial changes. "From all of 
these causes therefore technological and business changes 
create a considerable amount of 'temporary' unemployment 
27 
which in the short run creates havoc." 
Douglas was fully aware that the transitional unemploy-
ment concomitant to teChnological progress was one of the 
most serious defects of the laissez-faire economic society. 
To resolve and temper both the amount of work lost and the 
time lapse between old and new employment he suggested: 
the forecasting of the amount of labor likely to be dis-
placed by new techniques, the proper scheduling of new methods 
to minimize layoffs, the retraining of workers through an 
expanded vocational rehabilitation program~ the establishment 
of public employment offices to relocate the idle laborers 
in other industries or areas, the granting of adequate dis-
missal wages by employers, and the erection of a system of 
28 
unemployment insurance. In the words of Douglas: " ••• 
while technological unemployment is a transitional problem 
27 Douglas and Director, 2£• cit.~ P• 147. 
28 Ibid., PP• 151-158. 
Douglas, "Machinery and Unemployment," loc. cit., pp. 
45-46. 
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r rather than the permanent fate of the displaced workers~ we 
should set ourselves to cope with it. Society need not fear 
the ogre of ever-cumulating unemployment~ but it should deal 
with it effectively. It can do so if it only will.n29 
Douglas was indeed a harbinger of things to come 
since most of his program for alleviating the stresses of 
transitional technological unemployment has been adopted. 
Unemployment insurance has become an integral part of the 
American economy along with public employment offices and 
vocational training programs. Labor unions are now demanding 
dismissal wages for their members in. new contract negotia-
tions. Thus the past two decades have changed radical ideas 
into prophetic ones upon this subject. 
D. Business Cycles and Cyclical Unemployment 
Although Douglas like most labor economists had 
explanations of the causes and the pattern of the business 
cycle, his major contribution in this field was towards 
combatting the unemployment effects of the cycle rather than 
in his cyclical theory. The next section (E) will explain 
his proposals for alleviating cyclical unemployment through 
"pump-priming," government employment of'fices, e.nd unemploy-
ment insurance. Here a brief explanation of' Douglas' view 
of' the business cycle itself and the cause of the depression 
29 Douglas, ''Machinery and Unemployment," loc • .2l:!·, 
P• 46. 
of 1929 will be presented. 
Douglas thought of a depression in the light of a 
forest fire: 
Once a fire of any magnitude starts it 
heats the immediate atmosphere about it. The 
hot air immediately ris es and the cold air 
rushes in to fill the void. But all this neces-
sarily creates a wind which fans the flames; 
this in turn generates more hot air while the 
hot air will create more wind and the wind more 
fire. And so the forest fire moves cumulative-
ly onward. It is jus·t so with business de-
pressions •••• 3o 
To Douglas an analysis of the process of forest fire-
like depression was most important since be believed that 
depression was governed by its own laws which caused it to 
gather momentum and become cumulatively more disastrous. 
Initially the entrepreneurs' belief that profits were going 
to shrink would brir~ about a curtailment of production of 
consumer goods which in tur.n would necessitate a cutting 
down of the laborforce bringing a smaller amount of purchas-
ing power available for the consumer. The next step toward 
. business collapse was a decrease in the production of capital 
goods at a faster declining rate than that of consumers' 
goods; this development added workers to the ranks of the 
unemployed and further lowered purchasing power. Then the 
banks would both recall loans and reduce the amount of credit 
for business which would again lower the volume of production. 
30 Douglas, Paul H., World Unemployment (London: League of 
Nations Union, 1931), P• 5. 
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Prices would ~all severely because o~ the accumulation o~ 
large inventories and o~ overproduction in line with the 
~alling level o~ purchasing power. Both the velocity o~ 
money and credit would slacken since saving and less spending 
would ensue, and purchasing power would be dammed up in the 
banks. Along with these ~orces leading to a downward spiral 
there would be a cutting o~ wages which would once again 
decrease the ~ount o~ purchasing power in the hands of the 
31 
consumers. Through the interrelationship o~ the many 
~actors in the business system one played upon the other and 
caused a cumulative degeneration of the economic structure. 
In the revival phase of the business cycle Douglas 
professed to model his description upon the analys~ of 
32 
Professor Mitchell. After the depression phase bad been 
on the scene for some time with its concomitants of unem-
ployment, idle capital equipment and funds, entrepreneurs 
would once again be optimistic toward profit expectancy 
because of low interest rates, idle cash savings, lowered 
overhead and selling costs, eradication of marginal concerns 
and depleted stocks of goods and raw materials. Thus the 
cumulative impetus to production would be a~forded by retail 
and wholesale concerns placing orders for consumer goods, 
31 Douglas, Paul H., Controlling Depressions (New York: 
w. w. Norton & Co., 1935), pp. 9-30. 
32 Mitchell, Wesley c., Business Cycles (Berkeley, Univer-
sity of California Press, 1913). 
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thus stimulating manufacturing. As orders would expand, the 
capital goods industry would return to production; bank 
credit would increase; prices would tend to rise; workers 
would return to work; and consumer purchasing power would 
increase. The process would turn over and over again as 
business sentiment would turn from pessimism to an optimistic 
nature as the profit potential would return; higher wages, 
higher prices, an increasing laborforce, bigger inventories, 
I 
new developments in capital equipment, and greater purchasing 
power. All the cumulative factors together would lead the 
depression phase of the cycle into the revival period and 
33 
then into an era of prosperity. 
The important question of how the depression phase 
of the cycle leaped across its downward spiral barrier to 
connect with the revival phase was enigmatical to Douglas. 
He could not agree wi·th Professor Mitchell's theory that the 
economic forces themselves provided the "missing link" to 
stimulate the rebirth of revival through an increased con-
sumer demand, increased investment of idle capital, and 
lowered costs and overhead in industry to provide a profit 
34 
outlook. Douglas refuted the Mitchell theory by contend-
ing that: (1) money would not be forthcoming to increase 
consumer purchasing power since depression would eradicate 
33 Douglas and Director, 2£• cit., PP• 169-174. 
34 Mitchell, ~· cit., pp. 562-568. 
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savings of the masses; (2) the supply of raw materials would 
not be depleted during the depression to permit increased 
production; {3) individual capital would not be forthcoming 
for investment since individual savings would have decreased; 
(4) monopolies and unions could prevent prices and wages 
from adjusting so that purchasing power would not be stimu-
lated. 35 
Moreover, economic history had pointed out that past 
depressions were cured not by the inherent quality within 
economic forces to breed revival, but by accidental external 
happenings. Wars, the gold rush, railroad expansion, the 
automobile, the development of world markets provided econom-
ic activity which stirred a linkage between depression and 
36 
revival. The laissez-faire economy itself could not 
cushion its downward depression spiral since it had no means 
of infUsing the life blood of purchasing power into the 
system. Douglas, therefore, castigated the negative 
approach to the problem and advocated a firm constructive 
policy of planning to alleviate unemployment and to increase 
purchasing power. 
Rererring specirically to the economic collapse of 
1929 with the millions of workers unemployed Douglas believed 
that the originating causes of the business decay were the 
35 Douglas, Controlling Depressions, PP• 85-95. 
36 ~., PP• 79-84. 
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.following: (1) A rigidity of prices and wages invoked by 
monopolistic control which tended finally to reduce purchas-
ing power~ restrict output~ and increase unemployment. 
Between 1922 and 1929 output per man-hour increased 30%~ 
hourly earnings increased 8%, labor costs were reduced on 
an average of 14%~ prices fell only ~·~ profits increased 
84%, production increased only 37%. Here the stickiness of 
prices caused an overinvestment of profits and bank credit 
in capital goods production, and an overspeculation in pro-
ducers' goods, the stock market and real estate. Thus 
monopolistic and quasi-monopolistic combines' maintenance 
" 
o.f prices tended to break the back of the supply of purchas-
ing power and cause widespread unemployment. (2) Leading 
to the same conclusion of reduced purchasing power was the 
other cause of the Great Depression, the lagging of real 
wages and real income of workers and farmers behind the 
overexpanded output of industry which produced oversized 
profits. The outcome as pictured above was unemployment 
and a business bust when prices had to be reduced sharply 
to move inventories, and hence eliminated profits. 37 Allied 
with the above major causes of cyclical unemployment in the 
Thirties were the reduced purchasing power of the farmer 
through the great fall in the prices of agricultural com-
modities and some raw materials, the fall of the silver 
37 Douglas, Controlling Depressions, pp. 53-76. 
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38 price, and the increase in post-war tariffs. 
To classify Douglas• business cycle in a single niche 
it would seem that he would be placed with the "under con-
sumptionists11 since he stressed the laeH; of buying power of 
the consumer as the basis for depression. The inability of 
the consumer in periodic occurrences to purchase the amount 
of' production offered by industry at profitable prices caused 
a glut on the market; then goods would have to be sold at 
lowered rates stimulating a cumulative downhill business 
recession. Thus, "purchasing powertt was the key to the 
business cycle. 
Yet combined with underconsumption, Douglas utilized 
Mitchell's "profit-motive" theory in his analysis also. "In 
our analysis of business cycles, then, we must recognize that 
profit making is the central process among the congeries that 
39 
constitute the activities of a business economy." He 
emphasized the role of profit-making in the entrepreneur's 
mind's eye as the one which caused an increased or decreased 
production which in tur n would lead to either an expansion 
of business activity or unemployment and depression. 
It must be pointed up that a conflict exists between 
the two theories since increased profits could lessen the 
amount of purchasing power in the consumers' pockets. If 
38 Douglas, World Unemployment, pp. 11-15. 
39 Mitchell, w. c., Business Cycles: The Problem and Its 
Setting (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 
1_92!7) 1 p • 1~3. 
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business is stimulated through the expectancy of greater 
profits by the monopolistic practices of holding the price-
line amidst increased output and lowered costs and by lLmit-
ing wages, then purchasing power would disintegrate at a 
time of increased production. Contra if prices are lowered 
and wages are lifted to stimulate purchasing power, the 
margin of profits would be reduced and might hamper the 
growth of the economy. Douglas hinted at a reconciliation 
of the two ideas by contending that a slow decrease of 
prices and a gradual increase of wages would not h&mper the 
40 profit margin too greatly. The reconciliation of the 
inconsistencies of the theories were not spelled out however. 
In his analysis of the periodic fluctuations of 
business activity Douglas did not project a new approach to 
the cyclical problem which might more clearly illuminate it. 
Rather he incorporated the ideas of other economists to 
present his view of the rise and fall of the industrial 
world. His underconsumption theory did not emphasize two 
possible ideas, overs.aving or underinvestment, which might 
be the cause of the insufficiency of the consumers' money 
income. His theory did not explain why he expected profits 
to automatically return for reinvestment to ca.o.se over-
production rather than being dammed into savings to bring 
about underinvestment. One year after his book, Controlling 
40 Douglas, Controlling Depressions, P• 78. 
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Depressions, was published, a revolution in business cycle 
thinking occurred with the arrival of the underconsumption, 
underinvestment theory of John Maynard Keynes upon the 
41 
scene; Douglas' work had not forged a new frontier, 
whereas Keynes' had extended the understanding of the 
business cycle. 
E. Minimizing the Effect of Unemployment and Depressions 
1. Employment Exchanges 
I 
:I 
In 1931 when The Problem of Unemployment was published, 
the ideas of planned public works, unemployment insurance and 
public employment exchanges suggested therein for curing the 
unemployment and depression cancers were considered radical 
in natur~ in the United States. Then laissez-faire was the 
ruling doctrine of- the American economy in which the demand 
for and the supply of goods and services determined prices, 
and the prices regulated the individual producers and pur-
chaser~. Social security was a European experiment and not 
a part of the American economic system. And too, private 
fee-charging employment agencies were the controlling means 
of getting jobs and workers together. 
Two decades later after President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt's social experimentations in the "New Deai," 
41 Keynes, John M., General Theory of Employment, Interest, 
and Money (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1936). 
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emergency public works programs~ unemployment insurance, 
and the · public employment service were accepted as rational 
methods of combatting unemployment. Thus Douglas had proved 
himself a Cassandra in formulating ideas which were to become 
an integral part of the American system. 
The problem of unemployment was cancerous for the 
economic system both in prosperity and depression periods. 
In the period from 1897 to 1926 in the fields of manufactur-
ing, mining, construction, and transportation the estimated 
average of unemployment was 10.2,%, the peak being 23.1% for 
the depression year of 1921, and the lowest point, 5.5% for 
. 42 
the war year of 1918. In the depth of the Great Depression 
1932 to 1933~ the gross national production bad fallen to 
$56 billion or one half of the 1929 level, and one in every 
43 four persons was counted among the unemployed. 
To Douglas the initial step in minimizing unemployment 
was the creation of coordinated active public employment 
systems throughout the United States which would combat the 
delays and wastes of the distribution of labor and aid in 
readjusting changes in the demand for and supply of labor. 
He estimated that in 1930 there were approximately between 
44 3000 and 4000 fee-charging employment agencies and but 
42 Douglas, Real Wages, P• 460. 
43 Medvin, Norman, "Employment Trends During the Past Two 
Decades," Monthly Labor Review, 71:196, August, 1950. 
44 Douglas and Director, .2.£.• cit., P• 266. 
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180 public employment offices. 45 The private agencies 
were "guilty of great abuses against the workers,n 46 and 
the public offices were totally inefficient and inadequate 
to meet the needs of the jobless. The history of public 
employment exchanges in Europe since the first national sys-
tem in Great Britain in 1909 had been a successful one 
I 
and should have set a precedent for the United States to 
follow.·47 
Douglas was able to see his views become a reality 
48 
when in 1933 Congress legislated the Wagner-Peyser Act 
whiah created a new United States Employment Service to 
develop a system of public employment offices to be adminis-
tered by the states with the financial aid of the federal 
government. Between 1933 and 1937 these employment offices 
registered 26,912,000 applicants for work; a large part of 
the total being forced registrants for public works employ-
49 
ment. The new federal system has been a great force in 
attempting tomitigate the evils of unemployment by regis-
tering the main labor pool of an area, lowering the number 
45 Douglas and Director, ££• cit., p. 336. 
46 Ibid., PP• 266-273. 
47 Ibid., PP• 289-316. 
48 Stat. L. 113. 
49 Atkinson, H. c., Odencrantz, L. c., and Deming, B.~ 
Public Employment Service in the United States (Chicago: 
Public Administration Service, 1938}, P• 29. 
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of misfit hirings, providing labor mobility, and selecting 
50 labor for public works programs. 
2. Planned Public Works 
In 1931 when Douglas advocated a system of planned 
public works to meet the emergency of depression unemploy-
ment, the prevailing view among classical and neoclassical 
economists was that public spending was unproductive w~ile 
private spending was productive, and that public expenditures 
51 
were made at the expense of private spending. Douglas, 
however, refuted the above view and wanted to utilize a 
government program of public works as a means of stabilizing 
the economy and attacking unemployment. Public works should 
not be undertaken in a period of prosperity since the govern-
ment expenditures would strengthen the inflationary factors 
by increasing the demand for labor and capital; rather public 
construction should be performed in the depression phase of · 
the cycle when private spending was limited so that the 
deflationary tendencies could be retarded. In other words, 
the "pump-priming" should move inversely to the business 
cycle in that government spending would become more rapid 
during the depression phase and slower during the prosperity 1 
50 Atkinson, Odencrantz and Deming, ££• cit., pp. 13-17. 
51 Harris, Seymour E., The National Debt and the New 
Economics (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1947), 
P• 70. 
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phase. Thus the planned public works program would reduce 
unemployment by pumping more monetary purchasing power into 
circulation to increase the demand for consumers' goods~ and 
thereby revitalize both the consumer and capital goods 
production. Moreover, the cost to the government of the 
public expenditures would be reduced since material, interest 
rates, and wages would be obtainable at a lower rate during 
52 
a depression. 
In The Problem of Unemployment in 1931 Douglas was 
harassed by the lack of centralization in the American system' 
o:r government to control the public works program. "In the 
Unit ed States any very large degree o:r centralization is 
inconceivable. The most important spending agencies are the 
municipalities, and the federal government is least important, 
responsible for no more than ten per cent of the total.n53 
:Moreover~ although his theory of 11 pump-priming" was clearly 
formulated, there were many loose ends that had to be tied 
together to form a definite controlled public works policy. 
By 1935 in his work, Controlling Depressions, the views were 
more refined. President Roosevelt's "New Deal" program had 
created a more centralized federal government which elimi-
nated one problem for Douglas in this work. He incorporated 
52 Douglas and Director, £2• cit., pp. 192-221. 
Douglas; Controlling Depressions, pp. 123-142. 
53 Douglas and Director, £2• cit., p. 215. 
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Keynes' multiplier views into his own to show that the 
indirect effects of the added purchasing power through public 
works would be greater than the direct stimulation, i.e. 
each dollar expended through a public works program would 
create total purchasing power of' approximately $2.80. 55 More-
over, he crystallized his thinking on the form of' public 
works projects by advocating a five billion dollar outlay 
for slum clearance and public housing; this program would 
not only tend to fill a great need in the nation, but it 
would also stimulate production and employment in the durable 
goods industries.56 He hoped that the public works program 
could be financed by a balancing of governmental expendi-
tures and tax receipts over a long period of' time as govern-
ment outlays would increase during depressions and decrease 
during prosperity. If not, a managed national paper currency 
should be established since it could best be coordinated with 
the federal government's fiscal and public works program, and 
interest would not have to be repaid as in the issuance of 
Treasury bonds. 57 
Douglas' ideas on government spending have been 
54 Keynes, John Maynard, The Means to Prosperity (London: 
Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1933), PP• 9-12. 
55 Douglas, Controlling Depressions, pp. 124-126. 
56 ~-~ pp • . l28-134. 
57 Ibid., PP• 135-141. 
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ampl1~1ed and furthered by the popularity of Keynesian 
economics the past fifteen years. Lord Keynes in The General 
Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money propounded the 
theory that government spending in a managed economy could 
alone combat unemployment and depression since a system of 
laissez-faire would continually create serious business 
crises through the disequilibrium of savings and investments. 
The Keynesian analysis adopted the idea of the continuous 
full employment of the labor force as the goal of the economy 
to reduce the evils of cyclical fluctuations; Douglas had not 
gone that far in his public works program since he considered 
the government spending as a method of minimizing a cyclical 
depression rather than as a means of eliminating the cycle. 
He had rebelled against the orthodox cycle theory approach 
of the competitive market automatically resetting itself 
from depression to widespread employment without governmental 
succor since he believed that capitalism could perish without 
a planned economy. Thus Douglas· and Keynes were closely 
allied in theorizing of a managed economy with a public works 
program as the main weapon in pumping blood into the arteries 
o£ a £altering free enterprise system which was constantly 
beset with unemployment. However~ Douglas had not been able 
to forge a program as lucid or as all-encompassing as the 
Keynesian analysis for prosperity through a high scale of 
national income and full employment. 
71 
The public works program could possibly stumble upon 
many loose planks in its practice. Pro£essor Slichter along 
with many other economists believed that large outlays on 
governmental construction could intensi£y the depression by 
creating a "highly arti£icial" economy which would make 
business more conservative and by producing a deflationary 
e££ect through a £ear o£ in£lation caused by large-scale 
58 
spending and the swi£t rise in the public debt. Contra 
Douglas believed that the injection o£ monetary purchasing 
power by public works would instill optimism into the entre-
preneurs and set the production wheels rolling. Then too, 
somewhat shortsightedly in light o£ the American debt o£ 
approximately $300 billions, he £elt that the public debt 
would not rise by public works but the surplus o£ the 
prosperity phase o£ the cycle would supply the funds £or 
the downswing expenditures. 
Thus two decades ago Douglas was a harbinger o£ the 
trend o£ a long-term de£iciency o£ consumer demand in the 
economic system and £oresaw the necessity o£ large public 
works programs by the government to stimulate spending. He 
opposed the 11laissez-£aire" system o£ private enterprise as 
being inherently unbalanced and hampered with rigid prices 
and wages, monopolies, and combinations; it could only lead 
58 Slichter, Sumner H., "The Economics o£ Public Works," 
The American Economic Review, 9:174-185, March, 1934. 
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towards periodic widespread unemployment and potential revo-
lution. Although he did not spell out the patterns of full 
59 employment and a managed economy as broadly as Keynes, 
Beveridge, 60 and Hansen61 were able to do a few years later, 
Douglas greatly contributed to the idea of unemployment 
control through deficit spending. 
3. Unemployment Insurance 
To most Americans at mid-century unemployment insur-
ance and its other social security partners, old-age assist-
ance, children's aid, aid to the blind, etc., have become a 
normal and natural concept of government. The people have 
come to believe that it should be the duty of government to 
provide an economic security program which would provide 
assistance in case of unemployment, disability, or death. 
Yet but twenty years ago unemployment insurance was not a 
part of either the state or municipal or federal governments. 
Although the initial union plan for unemployment insurance 
was established in 18311 in 1932 every plan was a voluntary 
one and in 1934 less than 100,000 union members were covered 
62 by unemployment insurance reserves. 
59 
60 
Keynes, ££• cit. 
Beveridge, William H., Full Emplo~ent in a Free Society 1 (New York: W. w. Norton and Co., 1945). 
61 · Hansen, Alvin H., Fiscal Policy and Business Cycles 
(New York: Vi. W. Norton and Co., 1941). 
62 Committee on Economic Security, Social Security in America 
(Washington: u. S. Government Printing Office, 1937), 
p. 8. 
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Directly arter the collapse or American business in 
1929 Douglas was convinced that unemployment insurance was 
an imperative need or the economy. Fortunately he was pro-
vided the opportunity to blend his ideas on this subject to-
gether by being appointed Director of the Swarthmore Unem-
ployment Study in 1930 and in his association as a member or 
both the New York and Pennsylvania Committees on unemployment 
that same year; in 1931 he fUrthered his research abroad 
on the European security systems as a recipient of a Guggen- , 
heim rellowship. 63 Thus armed with ideas gained through 
strenuous research, he was well equipped to forward a prag-
matic approach on social legislation. 
Prior to the passage or social security legislation, 
the unemployed worker was fac ed with a perilous and disastrous 
outlook. He had depended on his job to supply him with wages 
by which payment he and his family might live; he had no 
control over that job whatsoever. The loss of the job per se 
was not the important consideration, rather the absence or 
wages would cut off his livelihood and bring about economic 
calaraity. The American capitalistic economy inflicted the 
worlrer with the pains of Job's boils when forced into involun-
tary unemployment as his income vanished completely. 64 To 
63 Douglas, Paul H., Standards of Unem lo ent Insurance 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1933 ,pp. ix-x. 
64 Epstein, Abraham, "Social Security, Fiction or Fact," 
The American Mercury, 33:129-138, October, 1934. 
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ward o£f complete physical disintegration the unemployed 
worker had recourse only to his own personal savings
1 
or 
private or public charity. Savings could be of little 
succor to the unemployed since in 1928, a prosperous year, 
earnings of fourteen million employed non-agricultural 
workers was but $1504 per year, or approximately $29 per 
65 
week; little or nothing could be banked from that wage. 
In the Twenties, moreover, the practice of instalment buying 
tended to keep people in debt, banl{ .failures wiped out the 
small savings of hundreds o.f thousands of people, and the 
stock market crash was catastrophic for many more. The 
second solution, charity, was not only a most humiliating 
and demoralizing method of aiding the unemployed, but it was 
also totally inadequate and uncertain. Charity in the 
United States was a modernized version o.f the out-dated 
Elizabethan poor-law dole since it was confined to the doling 
out of a meager supply of bread, soup and medicine to the 
destitute; it brought about social tragedy as it tended to 
wreck the independence, self-esteem and pride of the unem-
66 played workers. The complete inadequacy of the charitable 
aid was pointed out when in 1932 between $400 and $500 millions 
were expended on relief to unemployed families while approxi-
65 Douglas and Jennison, ££• cit., P• 27. 
66 Armstrong, Barbara Nachtrieb, "The Nature and Purpose of 
Social Insurance," Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, 170:1-6, November, 1933. 
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mately $15 billions were lost in wages by the jobless.67 
In the United States there had been strong opposition 
to the concept o~ unemployment insurance as a protective 
measure against the worker's insolvency. There was a wide-
spread misconception o~ the British system which had actually 
aided .the unemployed immeasurably; it was considered a mere 
11hand-out 11 technique which ~ostered voluntary joblessness. 68 
Then too~ besides the negativeness of the employers and 
their lobbies, the trade unions had not taken an a~firmative 
stand in ~avor o~ the legislation, President Samuel Gompers 
o~ the American Federation of Labor being violently against 
unemployment insurance. Finally there were grave doubts 
concerning the constitutionality o~ a national unemployment 
69 
system. 
Douglas resisted the ~orces allied against economic 
security and became one of the prime movers ~or incorporating 
unemployment insurance in our legislation. In four works in 
70 
which he wrote upon the subject he contended that unemploy-
ment insurance would bring in general more stable and just 
relief to the jobless than the inadequate and humiliating 
67 Douglas, Standards of Unemplo~ent Insurance, p. 16. 
68 Armstrong, ££• cit., p. 5. 
69 Epstein, loc. cit., p. 134. 
70 Douglas and Director, ££• cit., PP• 484-490. 
Douglas~ Controlling DeEressions, PP• 251-264. II 
Dou~as, Standards of Unemplo~ent Insura~~, pp._20-30. 
Douglas, "Economics of Onemp~ent Relief, Amer1.can 
Economic Review, Supplement 23:51-54, Marcn, 1933. 
........... -------------------
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method of charity~ and it would tend to have a stabilizing 
influence upon the economy. The rationale behind his think-
ing was as follows: (1) The payment of compensation benefits 
would affirmatively increase the monetary purchasing power 
of the unemployed and would increase the demand for con-
sumers• products which would subsequently stimulate the 
demand for producers' goods. Thus not only would new jobs 
be created in revivified industries~ but also the gross 
national product would be raised. (2) The security in mind 
provided employed workers through adequate benefits in case 
of discharge would allay the dreaded fear of unemployment 
and both buoy up the amount of their purchases of consumers• 
goods and slacken their rush of personal hoarding when busi-
ness pessimism loomed. Therefore, by increasing spending 
and creating a better balance between saving and spending~ 
there would be less unemployment and a greater chance for 
business stability. (3) The insurance would tend to erect 
a pooled reserve fund for the workers to aid tham through 
critical business conditions in a similar fashion to that in 
which the separate corporations have established reserves to 
protect the owners of industry. (4) The unemployment re-
serve funds could be intelligently managed by the government 
either to aid in the creation of credit during deflationary 
trends, or to check loans in an over-expanding producers• 
goods market during inflation. Thereby~ the unemployment 
insurance pools could intertwine with business trends and 
77 
Douglas was against the Wisconsin method, although 
he admitted that it was a progressive step forward because 
he felt that indivi dual employers or industries could not 
have sufficient strength to stabilize employment, separate 
industry funds would produce a wide inequality of monetary 
benefits, and employers' associations would be given addi-
tional power to combat labor organizations by having control 
74 
over the separate funds. Contra, Douglas advocated a 
centralized state pooled-insurance fund administered by both 
workers and employers into which both the employers and the 
employees would contribute a stipulated percentage of tbe 
wages. Some of the stipulations of his proposals were: 
(1) Coverage should include all manual workers in industries 
other than agriculture employed in businesses with three or 
more workmen and all clerical workers whose salary is less 
75 
than $2000 annually; (2) benefits should be graduated from 
60 per cent to 30 per cent of the working earnin.gs based on 
76 
the wage scale of the workers; ( 3) · cost of the insurance 
would require an assessment of approxtmately 3.75 per cent 
74 
75 
76 
Douglas, Paul H.~ Social Security in the United States 
(New York: Whittlesey House, 1936), pp. 13-14. 
Douglas, Paul H., "To What Degree Can Business Prevent 
Unemployment?" American Labor Legislation Review, pp. 
273-281, September, 1930. 
Douglas, Problem of Unemployment, P• 490. 
Douglas, Standards of Unemployment Insurance, PP• 84-89. 
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of the total wages and salaries; 77 (4) contributions to the 
insurance fund should be divided so that workers would pay 
1.?5 per cent of wages and salaries and employers 2.50 per 
78 
cent. Administr ation of the insurance fund would be 
planned so that the reserves would not only be liquid and 
secure, but also a dynamic force in increasing or decreasing 
credit to mitigate depressions; 79 experience ratings should 
govern contributions of the employers to provide an incentive 
80 for stabilizing employment in a plant. Besides this pro-
gram which would better distribute the risks of unemployment 
and provide a "front line trench" to combat depression, it 
would be necessary to have a positive system of relief to 
care for people both unqualified for unemployment compensa-
tion and jobless a longer period than the benefits would be 
81 forthcoming. 
There was much support for Douglas' proposals during 
the early years of the 1930's when the movement for unemploy-
ment insurance was gaining strong impetus in the United 
States. Two pioneering spirits in the field of social 
?? Douglas, Standards of Unemployment Insurance, pp. 123-125. 
78 Ibid., p. 157. 
79 Ibid., PP• 176-180. 
80 Ibid., pp. 157-160. 
81 Douglas, Paul H., "Unemployment Insurance and Relief," 
New Republic, 81:161-163, December 19, 1934. 
80 
security, Abraham Epstein and I. M. Rubinow, supported the 
pooled fund idea, and the Ohio Commission on Unemployment 82 
advocated a program which was analogous in most details to 
that of Douglas. After considerable Committee wrangling, 
the Congress finally enacted legislation on August 18, 1935 
which would assist the states in working out unemployment 
83 insurance provisions for themselves. 
84 
The passage of the Federal Social Security Act pro-
vided the stepping-stones upon which the several states 
could enact unemployment insurance legislation with monetary 
grants from the federal government. Many of Douglas• ideas 
upon the subject were a part of the bill although in general 
it was a compromise measure between the Wisconsin method and 
the state pooled-fund approach. Contributions were to be 
made by the employers alone, yet aside from the provisions 
of the La Follette Amendment which allowed a system of plant 
reserves, the Federal Unemployment Trust Fund was to be the 
agency to hold the contributions. The gist of the federal 
legislation on unemployment insurance was as follows: the 
Federal Government imposed an excise tax on the payrolls of 
employers with provisions that up to nine tenths of tb.e tax to 
82 
83 
84 
Re ort of the Ohio Commission on Unem lo ment Insurance 
1932, 1933 , 2 vols. 
Dougias, Social Security, PP• 17-127. 
Public-No. 271-74th Congress, H.R. 7260; Ch. 531, 
49 Stat. 620; 42 u.s.c. (1935 Supp.) §§ S~}l -305. 
81 
be paid by the employer could be offset if it were paid into 
an approved State unemployment compensation system; one-
tenth of the tax paid to the Federal Government would be 
utilized to make grants to the States to aid tham in paying 
for the administrative expenses of the system. The moneys 
collected by the States for unemployment compensation would 
be deposited into the Federal Unemployment Trust Fund which 
would serve as a banking agent for the States and as an 
instrument for stabilizing credit conditions. With the 
approval of the Federal Government, the States would provide 
their own standards of benefits, incentive plans, waiting 
periods, etc. 
Although Douglas was impressed with the potential 
good that the Federal Social Secirity Act could provide by 
granting some monetary purchasing-power contribution to the 
jobless, yet he believed that it should only be the founda-
tion upon which greater security could be obtained. Addi-
~ional funds should be secured to assist states with high 
unemployment rates to provide minimum unemployment benefits, 
emergency benefit funds should be created to provide compen-
sation for prolonged joblessness, and the self-employed 
85 
should be protected. 
Behind all these attempts to attain security 
within our present system lies the question as 
to whether our social and political structure will 
85 Douglas, Social Security, pp. 292-303. 
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itself prove secure. It is menaced to-day by 
business depressions and by war. If it is not 
able to prevent these twin scourges from assum-
ing violent form, it will be inevitably changed 
and transformed. The real struggle for security 
may therefore be carried through upon a larger 
stage than that which has been sketched in this 
book. But in that larger struggle o~6mankind this smaller one will have its part. 
86 Douglas, Social Security, pp. 304-305. 
Chapter V 
WAGES 
Were the methods of wage payments proper? How had 
the condition of the worker improved or deteriorated between 
1890 and 1928? What determined the size of the wages that 
the various classes of society were to receive from produc-
tion? These questions of wage payments, real wages, and 
wage determination had long been debated by labor economists 
throughout the world; the wage problems were complex and 
illusory. 
In the discussion of wages that follows, it will be 
noted that Douglas attacked each one of the important wage 
issues and attempted to present a practical, although some-
times not entirely satisfactory solution to each problem. 
In his studies, he developed,first, a method of wage payment 
based upon the family size; second, an index of the material 
progress of the wages and salaries of American workers; and, 
finally, a law of production. 
A. The Family Allowance System 
During World War I and the post-war period poverty 
and economic distress plagued a huge number of families in 
every country in the world. Douglas had thought carefully 
84 
about the miseries inflicted upon millions of families and 
was led to the belief that some action should be taken to 
better the standards of the dependents of these families. 
Large families had been especially inflicted with degrada-
tion during that time because of great scarcity and a 
tremendous series of price fluctuations. 
I To combat the distress, he advocated a family allowance 
system under which there would be an adequate minimum wage 
to support single men plus additional allowances for dependent 
wives, children, and other adults.l In other words, a system 
of family allowances would be established in which compen-
sation would. be made for dependents, distinct from wages, not 
because of any economic productiveness from the dependents or 
the provider, but just because these dependents existed. 
Douglas contended that the system of family allowances 
would provide a much more equitable solution to the problem 
of poverty among workers' families than the "living wage" 
concept. The living wage doctrine had adopted the standard 
of the family of five as the number of persons dependent 
upon the gainfully employed. However, there was no statisti-
cal data to substantiate this doctrine, and it could be con- 1 
2 
sidered a fiction. 
Investigations tended to prove that the family of five 
1 Douglas, Paul H., Wages and the Family (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1925), p. ix. 
2 1]1£., pp. 26-40. 
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could be descriptive of only a relatively small percentage 
of the total cases studied as seen in the following tables. 
These statistics plus other similar studies compiled through-
out the world made it clear that there was no justification 
for the utilization of the standard family of husband, wife, 
and three children in the doctrine of the "living-wage. 11 
Therefore, if the "living-wage" principle was to hold any 
. weight as a system of wage regulation, there could not be a 
basic minimum wage without taking into consideration family 
needs. Rather as Douglas stated: "Should not the real 
principl~ be that, as needs are not uniform, but variable, 
so the minimum wage should not be uniform, but should vary 
3 
according to the needs of the worker and his f amily?" 
Besides the inconsistencies in the standard family of 
five as the group to be supported by the wage-earner, it 
would be impossible for industry to provide wages to every 
male worker to support that size family. By means of a 
statistical approach in which he approximated the total 
cost of wages for the standard family of five and compared 
same with the gross national product, Douglas determined 
that not only could the capitalistic economic system of the 
United States not sustain the cost of these wages, but 
similarly socialism and communism could not pay the sums 
4 
required by the living-wage. It would not be feasible 
3 Douglas, Wages and the Family, p. 41. 
4 Ibid., pp. 11-16. 
Table III 
A Study of 974,966 Male Wage-earners in 
Australia and their Dependent Children.5 
Number of 
Number of Workmen Dependent Children 
4:38,7:35 oa 
90,617 ob 
69,174 00 
78,288 1 
77,752 2 
220,400 :3 or more 
a Unmarried 
b Married with no dependent ohildren 
o Married with no ohildren 
5 Memorandum by Mr. Piddington, Report of the Royal 
Commission on the Basio Wage, Australia, November 
2:3, 1920. 
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Table IV 
Workmen in Seven English Cities in 1911 
Classified According to the Numbe~ of 
Children Dependent upon Them. 
No.Dependent Children No. Workmen out 
under 14 Years of 1000 
0 531 
1 162 
2 125 
3 84 
4 55 
5 28 
6 10 
7 4 
8 or more 1 
6 Bowley(, A. L., "Earners and Dependents in English 
Towns,' Economica, May, 1921, p. 111. 
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for the economy of a country to set as its standard wage 
for all workers a sum based upon an approximate 8 or 9 per 
cent of the employees who alone had a wife and three chil-
dren to support; the total monetary outlay in wages could 
not be supported. 
Besides Douglas' rationale in favor of a family allow-
ance system based on need, there were other supports of im-
portance for the system. In France it was hoped that family 
allowances would not only check the steadily declining birth 
7 
rate, b-ut also stimulate an increase of population. In 
Australia the population approach was likewise important. 
In Great Britain since a method of increasing population 
would be considered in a negative light and openly criti-
8 
cized, the system was grounded on the theory of obtaining 
an equal wage rate for women as for men for equal work-
loads. "We should know what part of each income was wages 
and what part society's method of providing for its own re-
production--and the latter part would be paid to the wives 
and children on whose shoulders rests the real burden of 
9 
that special task." 
7 Hubert, Lucien, "La Nature Juridique du Sursalaire 
Familial," Paris, Societe Anonyme de Publications 
Periodiques, 1924. 
8 Fisher; Lettice, "Review of Douglas, Wages and the Family," 
Economic Journal, December, 1925, pp. 598-599. 
9 Rathbone, Eleanor F., The Disinherited Frumili (London: 
E. Arnold and Co., 1924), p. 158 
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In rebuttal to the French view that family allowances 
would stimulate the birth rate, it may be said that there 
has been no substantiation of that theory. In a statistical 
study Dr. Peret was able only to show that the number of 
children in each family remained constant after family allow-
ances had been granted although he suggested that the birth 
10 
rate would have dropped if not for the grants. . Colonel 
Guillermin's statistical evidence in later years was also 
inconclusive in showing population rises through allow-
11 
ances. Thus although an increased population may possibly 
be derived through a system of family allowances, it has not 
been proven and should not be considered as a substantiating 
motive for the adoption of the system. 
In relation to precedents for the family allowance 
system Douglas stated: 
The family allowance system is not an isolated 
attempt to get away from the practice of paying 
equal sums to those with an unequal number of 
mouths to feed. It is but one of a number of 
similar methods that have been applied in the 
attempt to provide variable payment for family 
needs •••• Society is beginning to recognize that 
needs are not uniform but variable and it is 
attempting from2many angles to make provision for that fact .l 
10 Compte rendu, III Congres National des Allocations 
Familiales, Bordeaux, 1921, pp. 86-88. 
11 Ibid., IV-VII Congres National. 
12 Douglas, Paul H., "Some Precedents for the Family Wage 
System," International Labor Review, March~ 1925, 
pp. 353-354. 
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He stressed the governmental war-period policies of providing 
separation allowances for the families of military personnel 
and food rationing, both based upon the number of depen-
13 dents. These war-time regulations would not seem to be 
valid precedents for family allowances since during a war 
emergency the economic and social conditions are very unlike 
those existing during normal peace times. War measures were 
of transient nature; rigid government control supplanted a 
freely competitive market; freedom of action was not an 
essential phase of the controlled war economy, rather in-
voluntary measures could be enacted. Thus, it seems a point 
of weakness to have based the proposed family allowances as 
a wage standard for the nation's economy upon precedents in 
force during a transient period of upheaval and strife. 
The fundamental structure of Douglas' family allow-
ance plan would be built as follows: a basic wage rated on 
the "subsistence-plus, or the minimum health-and-decency 
14 
standard of life ." would be the standard for both sexes; 
this minimum wage would be supplemented by an allowance 
15 
equal to 30 per cent of the minimum wage for the wife, and 
an allowance of 25 per cent of the same for each child until 
16 
the age of fourteen; the allowances would be financed by 
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assessments levied upon the employers which would be pooled 
into regional equalization funds to be administered by a 
joint board of employers and employees. 17 
There are many important considerations that emerge 
in a controversial way in connection with the above plan, 
such as whether a state financed system would be more ad-
visable than an industry one, and whether or not the pro-
ductivity of single men will be reduced by a decrease in 
their basic wage rate, and whether or not employers would 
favor single workers over the married ones with dependents, 
and whether or not the economy of the nation with its system 
of the free market and "laissez-faire" would be hampered, 
if not destroyed, by a wage concept that could possibly 
bring about a decreasing rate of production through lack of 
incentive amidst single men and women, and whether or not 
1 
the system should be a voluntary one or a compulsory federal 
program. As pertinent as such issues mew be, in the main 
they present merely a superficial approach to the fundamental 
problem, that is, the search to discover the economic rela-
tionship between wages and allowances. To analyze the con-
nection between wages and allowances, we shall study their 
potential characteristics under certain standard conditions. 
In the situation where only one company in a co~ 
petitive industry institutes a family allowance system, the 
17 Douglas, Wages and the Family, pp. 226-244. 
92 
payment of allowances will increase the total outlay of 
wages of that firm. Since competit i on will ltmit the firm 
from raising prices, the company will be placed in the 
position of losing profits through increased wages. The 
firm, therefore, will be forced either to discharge the 
married men with dependents or discontinue the system; in 
either event the total amount of wages or the wage rate 
will be unchanged. However, if under the same circumstances 
the incentive of allowances attracted a higher standard of 
workers, then increased productivity might compensate for 
the higher total outlay of wages. Then, of course, the 
allowance system would tend to be similar to a bonus for a 
stepped-up output, and the fir.m wou l d have received added 
goods for the additional wage outlay . It does not seem 
feasible that an employer would permanently hamper his 
profit position by granting allowances unless he could 
obtain productivity to compensate for the addition to the 
wage payment. 
The above situation of a single firm with family 
allowances would be somewhat different if it were operating 
under monopolistic conditions. Then the firm could either 
raise its prices to make up the cost of the allowances, or 
it could maintain prices and lower profit. The former ac-
tion would increase the total outlay of wages, but it would 
have a negative effect on the purchasing power of the con-
sumer; the latter, which is an unlikely step, would provide 
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a wage increase for the married workers with dependents and 
a total wage outlay rise although the bachelor's wage would 
be lowered. Even in this monopolistic situation, it is 
possible that employers might discriminate against workers 
with dependents and thereby negativize the wage hike. 
It should be suggested, also, that it seems somewhat 
fictional to assume that the single men and women in a plant 
would benevolently disavow their prevailing scale nf wages 
and accept large decreases so that fellow workers with 
dependents could obtain a higher wage through allowances. 
Does it seem credible to suppose that if A, a bachelor with 
ten years longevity in a plant, and B, a married man with 
a wife and five depemdent children and with two years 
service in a plant, were standing side-by-side in a produc-
tion line performing the same mission, that A would be con-
tent to have B obtain a wage almost three times that of A's 
18 basic wage? It is a potential factor to consider that a 
social upheaval might occur from such a sweeping attempt to 
redistribute the income. 
The next case study is that of a group of firms of 
all industries, paying a common rate of assessment into a 
regional equalization fund; this situation is the ideal 
18 Douglas, Wages and the Family, pp. 192-214. Under 
Douglas' proposals, A would receive $800 each year in 
wages, while B would receive $2040 each year, i.e. 
$800 basic wage, $240 allowance for wife, $200 allow-
ance for each child yearly. 
-------==-
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condition proposed by Douglas. In this situation there 
would be little discrimination against workers with no 
dependents as in the above situations since firms would pay 
into the equalization fund a fixed amount for each worker 
without regard for dependency status. However, since the 
funds are grouped in a regional way, all firms in a par-
ticular industry will not be a party to the allowance sys-
tem. Thus, firms in different regions not members in an 
equalization fund would have cost advantages over con-
tributing firms. The latter firms paying a higher labor 
cost than the former must obtain increased output per worker, 
or they will be priced out of the market. To equalize the 
wage costs in another way, the former firms could reduce 
sharply the basic wage price to compensate for the payment 
of allowances. Thus it seems axiomatic that in a competitive 
system even with the establishment of an equalization fund, 
the sum of direct wages plus the assessments to the fund must 
not be greater than the normal total outlay for wages . 
The next situation would be one in which the firms 
were grouped in an industry basis, not a regional one, in 
connection with paying assessments to the equalization fund. 
Here, if there are firms in the industry not a party to the 
plan, then the results in a competitive society will be the 
same as above. If, however, the entire industry contributes 
19 Douglas, Wages __ and the Family, p. 233. 
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for the allowances, then the added total wage outlay must 
af fect profits, wages, or purchasing power. The entre-
preneur can either cut the basic wage rate of workers sans 
dependents, or raise prices and provide an inflationary 
condition to decrease consumer purchasing power, or else 
sustain a lowered income. .~other factor to be considered 
is that an industry with a family allowance system may 
attract workers from industries not utilizing the systmn 
so that the competition among workers for positions in the 
former industry may tend to force do\v.n the wage rate. It 
seems most likely that the payment of these allowances will 
be cut out of the wage rate so that besides the redistribu-
tional effect of the system, labor will not gain in stature. 
Finally, we should picture an economic situation in 
which all industries are bound together into a single equali-
zation fund for the payment of family allowances; this set-up 
could only occur through Congressi.onal legislation. If in 
this picture both assessments and allowances are standard-
ized throughout the country, then the cost of the family 
allowances must be an incidence on either profits or wages; 
the consQ~er would not foot the bill through the payment of 
higher prices, because inter-industry competition would tend 
to bring forth the proper market price. Taking the cost of 
allowances from profits would bring about curtailed produc-
tion, a forcing of marginal firms out of business, and a 
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cumulative process that would increase unemployment. Through 
unemployment there would emerge strong competition for avail-
able jobs with its concomitant, a wage fall. Thus, it seems 
apparent that once again the payment of allowances will be 
burdensome in the main upon the wages. 
The strength of the bargaining position of labor will 
be an important factor in any of these case studies. If 
potent labor unions were the driving force behind the family 
allowance system, then it might be comprehensible to consider 
that the unions would attempt to restrict industry from 
lowering the wage rates to compensate for the added costs. 
However, it is improbable that unions would foster such a 
plan since the condition of unequal pay for equal work would 
cause deep unrest between union members and make too complex 
yearly drives for a general wage increase. 
In conclusion, an analysis of the family allowance 
system would seem to suggest that: (a) labor will not re-
ceive an increase in total wage payments by means of allow-
ances; (b) the system will cause a redistribution of income 
in which the workers with dependents will have a larger share 
of the total income, and the workers without dependents a 
smaller share; (c) although the total wage outlay will be 
unmoved, workers without dependents will suffer a decrease 
in the minimum wage rate, while workers with dependents 
will attain increased wages. This critique would tend to 
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suggest arguments in strong opposition to Douglas' theory 
in favor of the family allowance system. Although Douglas 
suggested many of the stumbling blocks to the scheme, his 
idealistic enthusiasm for overcoming poverty seems to have 
overpowered his rational thinking in relation to the practi-
cal workings of such a plan. It is almost incomprehensible 
to believe that he would have advocated a plan which had 
as its rudimentary piling for support a method of robbing 
Peter to pay Paul. 
B. The Measurement of the "Condit ion of the People" 
At this point in the mid-twentieth century as in 
centuries past, the paramount economic issue of the times 
is the material well-being of the worker and his family. 
The success or failure of the working class to advance 
their ways of life has repercussions throughout the breadth 
of the world. If the material progress and the welfare of 
the workers are advancing toward a more improved standard-
of-living through the years, then the structure of the 
economic system, and to an important extent the political 
organization, will be strongly entrenched and free from 
revolutionary attacks and probes; if, however, the working 
population is being pushed strongly toward greater poverty 
and insecurity, then society will be ripe for a change of 
economic methods. Just two decades past during the Great 
-4-
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Depression, the desperate plight of the workers necessitated 
a minor revolution in the capitalistic economy of the United 
States as many forms of government regulation were able to 
become imbedded in the economy, displacing the workings of 
"laissez-faire." It is comprehensible to speculate, more-
over, that had communistic Russia preached and acted in a 
peaceful fashion and thereby played a "waiting game" in its 
relationship with the world, then without the stimulus of 
defense production, the capitalistic society of the United 
States might have slowed down gradu&ly so that the material 
welfare of the worker would have a downward trend; during 
this trend of the working population's economic disintegra-
tion, it is patent that communism or socialism could have 
permanently displaced our economic methodology. 
Douglas was vitally aware of the importance of the 
material progress and welfare of the worker in the economic 
society. His awareness of the problem was reflected in the 
following statement: 
But the ultimate test for any industrial system 
is the d agree to which it improves the condition 
of life of the people who live under it. Material 
welfare is by no means all of life; but 1n a world 
in which scarcity still prevails, it is a neces-
sary prerequisite for the attainment of the great 
masses of mankind of those other aesthetic and 
emotional values which deepen and broaden the ex-
perience of those who realize them.20 
In order to attempt to discover the position of the worker, 
20 Douglas, Real Wage~, p. 3. 
99 
I -
he decided that he must measure the movement of real wages 
during a particular period of time. By thus analyzing the 
relationship of wages and earnings to the cost of living, he 
could determine whether the effective purchasing power of 
the American workers had increased or decreased, and by what 
extent. 
The movement of monetary wages and salaries would 
not alone reflect the economic progress of the workers. The 
"take home pay" of the workers could have been jumping in 
leaps and bounds over a long-run period, and yet the material 
welfare of that class could be falling steadily. If infla-
tion were rampant, as for example in Germany after World 
War I when millions of marks were needed for a loaf of 
bread and in China during the past decade when it was cus-
tomary to witness the people pushing wheelbarrows laden with 
paper money to buy a few necessities, then the monetary 
trend of wages would not point toward economic stability. 
Therefore, the trend of real wages was the most essential 
determinant of economic progress or stagnation. 
Douglas directed most of his tremendous driving power 
in research upon the study of real wages during the decade 
of the Twenties. After his minor works on the subject in 
1921, 21 in which he traced real wages from 1890-1918, and 
21 Douglas, Pau 1 H. and Lamberson, Frances, "The Movement 
of Real Wages, 1890-1918, 11 American Economic Review, 
11~409-426, September, 1921. 
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1926, real wages £rom 1895-1924, Douglas brought £orth in 
1930 his Real Wages in the United States, 1890-1926 which 
has become an economic classic. This work was the culmina-
tion of six years' exhaustive study and analysis of wage 
rates, earnings, the cost of living and unemployment; it 
required approximately 181 000 work hours of time and some 
3,000,000 statistical computations to produce this searching 
book. 23 In appraising the works on wages for the first 
half of the twentieth century for the Monthly Labor Review 
it was said: 
The most impressive effort during the half-
century to measure the material progress of 
the American working class is embodied in 
Paul H. Douglas' Real Wages in the United 
States, 1890-1926 •••• This volume remains the 
single most important reference source on 
levels and trends in wage rates, hours, and 24 
earnings for the period to which it relates. 
In Douglas 1 initial work on real wages, 11The Movement 
of Real Wages, 1890-1918," his aim was to continue for the 
years 1912-1918 a study of Dr. Rubinow 1 s which had been an 
25 
investigation of real wages £rom 1890-1912. Douglas' 
22 Douglas, Paul H., 11 The Movement of Real Wages and Its 
Economic Significance," American Economic Review, 
Supplement, 16:17-53, March, 1926. 
23 Douglas, Real Wages, p. ix. 
24 Douty, H. M., "Wages and their Interpretation: A Brief 
Appraisal of the Literature," Monthly Labor Review, 
Vol. 71, No. 1, July, 1950, P• 102. 
25 Rubinow, I· M., 11The Recent Trend of Real Wages," Ameri-
can Economic Review, 4:798-817, December, 1914. 
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work, following Dr. Rubinow's method, was a study of the 
relative purchasing power of an hour's work and a fUll-time 
week's work. 26 In the erection of indexes, he utilized the 
retail food prices of fifteen commodities for the cost-of-
living trend; for wa@S rates he used payroll figures of 
three groups of workers and union rates for seven groups. 
After comparing his indexes of wages with the cost of living, 
Douglas concluded that: 
••• the return in commodities which the American 
workman received for an equal length of time 
worked (one hour) [in 1918] was from 10 to 20 
per cent less than it was in the decade 1890-
1899, and from 7 to 17 per cent less than it was 
before the sharp upward movement of prices in 
1916. The purchasing power of the established 
week's work, moreover, was from 20 to 30 per 
cent less than in 1915. American labor as a 
whole, therefore, cannot legitimately be charged 
with having profiteered during the war.27 
It is important to note that Douglas abnegated the 
conclusions reached in the above study by pointing out the 
errors in the standards upon which the findings were based. 
The cost-of-living index based on the thirty retail food 
prices of the Bureau of Labor Statistics increased from 
1907-1914 much faster than other living costs; the union 
wage data also tended to underestimate the upward movement 
28 
of wages from 1914-1918. 
26 Douglas and Lamberson, 2£• cit., P• 420. 
27 Ibid., PP• 425•426. 
28 Douglas, Real Wages, pp. vii-viii. 
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In the work Real Wages in the United States, 1890-
~, Douglas first tackled the job of ~inding the cost o~ 
living ~or that period so that he could have a yardstick 
upon which to measure the wa09 trend. With the data he had 
available 1 he erected a cost-o~-living estimate ~or 1890-1914 
based on retail food prices of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
probable retail prices o~ forty-~our ~ood commodities as 
estimated ~rom wholesale prices, and probable retail prices 
o~ clothi ng, ~uel and light, rurniture, tobacco and spirits 
as again estimated ~rom wholesale prices; these figures were 
29 
weighted according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Then 
for 1915-1926 he made up a general index for the entire 
country by utilizing the average of the indexes o~ the total 
cost o~ living in thirty-three separate cities, and then 
30 
weighting them in relation to the population of the city. 
Then he tied the two indexes o~ living costs together to 
present the yearly picture of the trend in the cost of 
living. Although the cost-of-living index was derived in a 
piecemeal ~ashion, it was strengthened by the use of two 
different sets of weights: one for 1890-1914 which was 
based on family expenditures in 1901, the other for 1914-
31 1926 based on family consumption in 1918. Thus the two 
29 Douglas, Real Wages, pp. 19-42. 
30 Ibid., PP• 43-59. 
31 Ibid., P• 62. 
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different weighting standards allowed for potential changes 
in consumptiom habits at different periods of time. The 
trend of the cost of living is shown in Table v and Chart I 
for the period 1890-1926. 
Douglas• index of the cost of living for the period 
covered was subject to many defects because of the dearth 
of statistical records which are available in contemporary 
times. Professor Alvin Hansen criticized the index as being 
too weak to suppose exact measurements had been formed; the 
index should only be used as spotty guideposts of what has 
occurred in the cost of living, not as truths upon which 
conclusions might be drawn since people in 1926 did not 
live in the same way as those in 1890, thus there was no 
common ground upon which to measure the economic goods and 
~2 
services of the trend. However, it may be noted that even 
with the defects caused by unavailable statistics, the 
Douglas index was the best cost-of-living trend devised, and 
it served as a suitable basis upon which to measure the real 
wages of the period. 
Having obtained a cost-of-living index, Douglas' next 
step was to obtain an adequate index of the movement of wage 
rates so that the measurement of the decrease or increase in 
the purchasing power of money wages could be ascertained. 
This was a complex problem, since there were many different 
32 Hansen, Alvin H., "Review of Real Wages in the United 
States, 1890-1926, 11 American Economic Review, 20:747, 
December, 1930. 
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Table V 
Combined Index of Relative Livin§ Costs in 
Non Agricul~ural Areas o. 
Indexes of Living Costs 
Year 1890-99 1914 = 100 
= 100 
1890 104 '75 
1892 102 '73 
1894 9'7 '70 
1896 99 '72 
1898 100 '72 
1900 106 '76 
1902 111 80 
1904 115 83 
1906 119 86 
1908 121 8'7 
1910 128 92 
1912 133 96 
1914 139 100 
1916 149 10'7 
1918 218 157 
1920 286 206 
1922 229 165 
1924 234 169 
1926 241 1'74 
33 Adapted from Douglas, Real Wages, p. 60. 
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Chart I 
Combined Index of Relative Living Costs33a 
33a Douglas, Real Wages, P• 61. 
methods of measuring wages and earnings. However1 Douglas 
adopted his units of measurement and explored the maize of 
wage data. 
Initially, he measured the hourly and full-time weekly 
wages and earnings and the hours of work for manufacturing, 
the building trades, coal-mining, transportation~ government 
and professional workers, and unskilled workers. Then these 
indexes which included in averages of hours and of hourly 
earnings 7.0 million workers in 1890, 14.9 million in 1922~ 
and 14.0 million in 1926 were aggregated to show the trend 
34 in all industry. Table VI and Chart II relate the results 
of the research in the movement of work hours per week in all 
industry; the average work week decreased from 58.4 hours to 
49.8 hours, or approximately 14 per cent~ from 1890-1926. 
1 • Thus greater leisure was gained for the worker as· the average 
working hour was reduced 8.6 hours per week for the period 
covered. Table VII indicates the general upward trend of 
real hourly earnings with most of the increase concentrated 
in the years after World War I. Table VIII points up the 
results of work on full-time weekly earnings and demonstrates 
that money wages increased from $10.88 in 1890 to $31.24 in 
1926 and real wages from an index of 97 to 119 for the same 
period. Moreover, Chart III indicates that in the same 
period while coal-mining, farm labor, the professions, 
34 Douglas, Real Wages, P• 204. ~ 
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Table VI 
35 ' Standard Hours per Week in All Industry 
(Weights= ntimber employed in each year) 
Average Relative Hours 
Year Hours 1890-99 1914 
per Week =100 =100 
1890 58.4 101 109 
1892 58.2 100 109 
1894 57.8 100 108 
1896 57.9 100 108 
1898 57.6 99 108 
1900 57.3 99 107 
1902 56.3 97 105 
1904 55.7 96 104 
1906 55.3 95 103 
1908 54.9 95 103 
1910 54.6 94 102 
·1912 54.2 93 101 
1914 53.5 92 100 
1916 53.3 92 100 
1918 52.2 90 98 
1920 50.4 87 94 
1922 50.5 87 94 
1924 50.0 86 93 
1926 49.8 86 93 
35 Adapte d from Douglas, Real Wages, P• 208. 
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Chart II 
36 Average Standard Hours per Week in All Industry 
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36 Douglas, Real Wages, P• 209. 
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Table VII 
Real Hourly Earnings in All Industry37 
Year Real Hourly Earnings 
(1890-1899 = 1001 
1890 95 
1891 98 
1892 · 99 
1893 101 
1894 102 
1895 101 
1896 100 
1897 99 
1898 100 
1899 101 
1900 101 
1901 102 
1902 103 
1903 103 
1904 104 
1905 106 
1906 107 
1907 104 
1908 108 
1909 109 
1910 105 
1911 103 
1912 106 
1913 107 
1914 106 
1915 110 
1916 110 
1917 103 
1918 105 
1919 107 
1920 112 
1921 122 
1922 124 
1923 132 
1924 136 
1925 136 
1926 138 
37 Adapted from Douglas, Real Wages, P• 205. 
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Table VIII 
Average and Real Full-time Weekly Earnings in All Industry38 
(1890-1899 = 100) 
Real Full-time Weekly Real Full-time Weekly 
Year Earnings (weights = Earnings (weights = 
number employed in number employed each 
1890) year) 
1890 97 98 
1891 99 100 
1892 100 100 
1893 101 102 
1894 102 102 
1895 101 101 
1896 100 100 
1897 99 98 
1898 100 99 
1899 100 99 
1900 99 98 
1901 99 98 
1902 99 98 
1903 98 97 
1904 100 99 
1905 102 101 
1906 102 101 
1907 100 99 
1908 103 102 
1909 103 103 
1910 100 99 
1911 98 98 
1912 100 100 
1913 100 100 
1914 99 100 
1915 102 104 
1916 102 104 
1917 96 98 
1918 97 100 
1919 97 101 
1920 99 103 
1921 106 106 
1922 110 114 
1923 116 121 
1924 118 123 
1925 118 124 
1926 119 125 
38 Adapted from Douglas, Real Wages, pp. 210-211. 
Chart III 
Aver age Annual Percentage Gai n or Loss in Purchasing 
Power of a Full -time Week's Work i n Var i ous Major 
Industries.39 
(weights = number employed in each year) 
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building trades, and transportation showed a per cent gain 
in purchasing power on full-time weekly earnings, manu£actur-
ing stood still, and unskilled labor and government employees 
lost ground. 
It is important to note several factors from these 
tables: (1) although real hourly earnings in 1926 were 
38 per cent higher than in the 1890's, real fUll-time weekly 
earnings did not increase as fast as the hourly earnings 
because of the gradual reduction in the length of the work 
week; (2) the movement of real full-time weekly earnings 
came mainly in the decade of the l920 1 s as tie index for the 
period from 1890-1914 was very sluggish; in comparing the 
tables for real hourly earnings and real fUll-time weekly 
earnings the following movements are indicated: a) 1890-1900, 
there was little difference between the two indexes; b) 1900-
1914, because of a shortening of the hours in the work week, 
real full-time weekly earnings remained constant while real 
hourly earnings increased 5 per cent; c) 1914-1920 1 the 
latter again increased 6 per cent while the former failed 
to move during this war period because of another reduction 
in the hours o£ the work week; d) 1920-1926, the real hourly 
earnings increased 23 per cent and real full-time weekly 
earnings 20 per cent during this time of strong movement. 
Secondly, the average annual earnings o£ employed 
workers, or the total outlay of monetary wages disbursed in 
113 
a year divided by the average number of workers was derived 
for transportation, coal-mini ng, public service industries, 
government employees~ clerical workers, teachers, ministers, 
and manufacturing. The area covered was vast as Douglas 
estimated that the statistics obtained were in 1920 for 
16.9 million employees, or 73 per cent of the entire labor 
f orce working for wages or salaries. 40 Moreover, this 
clas sification of earnings was superior to the weekly 
statistics in showing wage progress because of the inclusion 
of absenteeism, overtime, and temporary layoffs in the wage 
indexes. The main weakness of this grouping stems from the 
fact that prolonged unemployment is not considered here, and 
thus does not reflect the true material adv~~ce of the 
workers. 
However, the statistics which Douglas calculated 
were another trend of material progress; they are shown in · 
Table rx. An analysis of this table reveals several im-
portant characteristics: (1) there was an increase of 35 per 
cent in the real average annual earnings of both urban and 
farm labor between 1890 and 1926, and yet only 20 per cent 
of the total gain (100 in 1890 to 107 in 1914) was obtained 
by 1914 whereas 54 per cent of the total gain (116 in 1920 
to 135 in 1926) was incurred in the period from 1920-1926; 
40 Douglas, Real Wages, p. 389. 
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Table IX 
A verage A nnua 1 E i d R 1 E i arn n~~ A~7L· , A~~=: , R~ln ngs i n All Industries 41 
i 
We ights = Weights = 
Year N.umb er . emQ10ied in 1890 Number emQlO;t[ed in each i[ear 
Excluding Including Excluding Including 
farm labor farm labor farm labor farm labor 
1890 98 98 99 100 
1891 101 101 102 102 
1892 102 102 103 104 
1893 100 101 101 102 
1894 98 98 98 98 
1895 102 102 102 l 101 1896 99 99 98 98 
1897 99 99 98 97 
1898 100 100 98 98 
1899 100 101 99 99 
1900 99 99 98 . 98 
1901 100 100 100 100 
1902 99 100 99 100 
1903 98 99 99 100 
1904 99 100 99 101 
1905 101 103 102 104 
1906 100 101 101 103 
1907 98 100 1 0 0 102 
1908 97 99 98 101 
1909 102 104 103 106 
1910 102 103 104 106 
1911 98 100 100 103 
1912 100 101 102 105 
1913 101 102' 104 107 
1914 101 102 104 107 
1915 102 104 106 110 
1916 105 106 109 113 
1917 101 103 105 110 
1918 I 104 I 106 108 I 113 1919 105 107 108 115 1920 106 108 110 116 
1921 111 110 116 118 
1922 117 115 120 124 
1923 123 121 126 131 
1924 122 121 126 131 
1925 122 121 126 132 
I 1926 125 123 129 
135 
41 Adapted from Douglas, Real Wages, pp. 392-393. 
(2) when comparing real average annual earnings with real 
full-time weekly earnings, it is discernible that the former 
gained 10 per cent more for the period than the latter be-
cause of the inclusion of bonuses, a steadier work factor, and 
overtime payments; (3) when farm labor is added to urban 
work, it is accountable for a gain of 6 per cent in the 
total real average annual earnings in 1926 which indicates 
the importance in the gains made .bY the rural workers to the 
whole wage picture; (4) the figures for 1926 of 123 in column 
three and 135 in column 5 point out that of the 35 per cent 
gain of the entire period two thirds only was effected by 
increased real earnings for the same work while one third 
received gains through a movement to better paid positions. 
Douglas was aware of the fact that he would not be 
able to measure the true trend of real wages from 1890-1926 
without considering the element of unemployment. To make 
an accurate appraisal of the material progress of the labor-
ing class it was necessary to incorporate the fluctuations 
of the volume of unemployment with the real wages for each 
year. If, for example, the index of real annual wages of 
the employed were steadily rising while the unemployment 
index was rising at a similar rate, then there would be no 
gain in the overall real wages for the working class. In 
this light he stated: 
If we are to determine the progress made by the 
wage-earners as a whole, we must therefore try 
116 
to measure these fluctuations in the relative 
amount of unemployment and, by combining them 
with the relative real earnings of those who 
have been employed, arrive at an index of the 
relative real income obtained by th~2entire working class considered as a unit. 
Douglas, therefore, estimated the yearly unemployment 
for the period 1890-1926 mainly by subtracting the number of 
~mployees from an approximate total l abor supply. He calcu-
lated the average unemployment in the manufacturing and 
43 transportation industries from 1889-1926 as 7.5 per cent; 
adding the building trades it was 8.7 per cent from 1897-
1926; and a total of the foregoing plus mining made it 10.2 
44 per cent from 1897-1926. With the calculated index of 
unemployment,broken down for different industries, Douglas 
related the statistics to the earnings of the various indus-
tries to derive the real wage trend which would more closely 
approximate reality than any other measurement since it 
would be corrected for the unemployment movement. 
In the manufacturing and transportation industries, 
the largest group of workers covered in Douglas' unemploy-
ment research, the average annual earnings of' the employed 
workers were translated into average annual earnings of the 
total supply of workers attached to the industries; then 
42 Douglas, Real Wages, p. 403. 
43 Ibid., p. 446. 
44 ~., p. 458. 
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these earnings were changed to relatives of money and real 
earnings; and finally changed into the real earnings of 
both the attached and the employed workers. The results 
obtained from this work will be seen in Table X and bring 
forth the following salient conclusions! (1) the index of 
the real earnings of those attached to these industries 
increased in normal years from 5 to 8 per cent after 1900 
above what they were from 1890-1900 because of both the 
large volume of unemployment during that decade and the 
relatively steadier employment from 1900-1926; not because 
of increased purchasing power by the employed workers; 
(2) , the unemployment factor causes a more violent fluctua-
tion in real earnings of the whole labor class from year to 
year than for those who remain employed; for example, in 
the depression year of 1921 the real earnings of those 
attached dropped from 121 to 102 while the real earnings 
of the employed workers increased from 114 to 116 since 
the cost of living fell faster than the wages; (3) the 
lower rate of unemployment in the later years of the Twen-
ties brought about an increase of from 7 to 8 per cent in 
the real earnings of the laboring class. 
Similar research was performed for the coal-mining 
and building trade industries, and for unskilled workers. 
The data was less searching than that available for manu-
facturing and transportation, but Douglas worked out 
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j 
~ear 
1890 
1891 
1892 
1893 
1894 
1895 
1896 
1897 
1898 
1899 
1900 
1901 
1902 
1903 
1904 
1905 
1906 
1907 
1908 
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Table X 
Relative Movement of Real Annual Earnings of Those Attached to the 
Manufacturing and Transportation Industries as Compared 
with that of the Workers Actually Employed Therein.45 
Relative Real Annual Earnings Relative Real Annual Earnings 
(1890-1899 = 100) (1890-1899 = 100) 
( 1) (2} (3) _( 1) (2) ( 3) 
Those Those Difference be- Those Those Difference be-
Attached Employed tween Relatives Year Attached Employed tween Relatives 
for Those Attached for Those Attached 
and Those Employed and Those Emp~oyed 
106 100 +6 1909 107 102 +5 
109 103 +6 1910 111 103 +8 
111 104 +7 1911 103 98 +5 
101 101 0 1912 107 100 +7 
89 96 -7 1913 107 102 +5 
100 102 -2 1914 99 101 -2 
92 98 -6 1915 100 102 -2 
93 97 -4 1916 113 105 +8 
94 98 -4 1917 110 102 +8 
102 99 +3 1918 117 109 +8 
102 97 +5 1919 119 111 +8 
106 99 +7 1920 . 121 114 +7 
107 100 +7 1921 102 116 -14 
106 99 +7 1922 114 121 -7 
102 99 +3 1923 135 126 +9 
108 101 +7 1924 128 126 +2 
108 101 +7 1925 133 126 +7 
107 99 +8 1926 136 128 +8 
94 96 -2 
Douglas, Real Wages, p. 465. 
relationships between employed and attached workers in 
each separate field and obtained results showing germane 
trends to the one explained above. 
Professor Alvin Hansen criticized Douglas' unemploy-
ment index very vigonously since he contended that the 
method of subtracting the total employed workers from a 
potential total labor supply in an industry could not be 
accurate and would lead to a wide margin of error. He felt 
that Douglas should not have drawn such fine estimates of 
unemployment and real earnings conclusions from such a 
hollow foundation of statist1cs. 46 
Douglas continued the measurement of real wages only 
through the period 1926-1928. In his research on that 
period he did not utilize unemployment data, and therefore 
derived statistics only for the employed urban and farm 
group. A summation of the results of his work as shown 
1n Table XIpoints out that real earnings for the groups 
increased by 2 index points in 1927, and 4 index points 
in 1928, or a total gain for the two years of 5 per cent. 47 
It should be noted that in this work the base year for 100 
is 1914 unlike the base of 1890-1899 in Real Wages in the 
United States. Aside from the gain in real earnings as 
indicated above, an analysis of the movement of real earnings 
46 Hansen, "Review of Real Wages, 11 1oc. cit., p. 749. 
47 Douglas and Jennison, ~· £!!., p. 27. 
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Table XI 
The Movement of the Average Earnings of Both 
Urban and Rural Employed Workers, 1926-28.48 
Average Annual 
of the Relative Relative 
Year Employed Annual Real Annual 
Workers Earnings Earnings 
(in Dollars) (1914=100) (1914=100) 
1926 1,375 219 126 
1927 1,375 219 128 
1928 1,405 224 132 
48 Douglas and Jennison,; _loc. ill·, p. 27. 
------- --==-=--~ 
for 1927 and 1928 presented no changes from the 1890-1926 
period. 
The movement of real wages having been determined, 
there were several other considerations to be analyzed in 
order to obtain a more perfect view of the material progress 
of the laboring class. Through research Douglas determined 
that government and charitable services had added 7 per cent 
in free services to the wage earner, and 5 per cent had been 
49 
added by a decline in the number of dependents. Thus, 
having seen previously in statistics the gain of 35 per 
cent in the real wages of the annual employed worker in 
1926 over the 1890-1899 period and the gain of from 7 to 8 
per cent in real earnings through the lower unemployment 
rate in 1926, an addition of the free income and the lowered ! 
dependency rate per employed worker to the forementioned 
would indicate that the real earnings in 1926 for the work-
ing class were approximately 55 per cent greater than for 
the period of 1890-1899. 
It was not sufficient for Douglas to merely provide 
the statistical measurement of the real earnings for the 
period, but he had to attempt to spell out also why the 
material progress of the workers had advanced as it had. 
He based the upward trend of real wages upon the great 
increase in productivity for the period. The physical output 
49 Douglas, Real Wages, pp. 481-491. 
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per employee greatly surpassed real earnings because of 
increases in the costs of marketing and distribution and 
due to higher prices for consumers' goods caused by a 
larger share of total production being used for capital 
50 goods rather than consumers' items. The relationship 
between physical productivity and real earnings in the 
manufacturing industry can be depicted in Table XII for 
tne period 1899-1925 wherein it is shown that physical 
productivity per worker increased 54 per cent, as real 
earnings lagged behind with a gain of only 30 per cent. 
On the other hand, value productivity based both 
upon the physical production of goods and the exchange 
ratio at which these goods were sold would ·provide a better 
comparison of real earnings and productivity since wages 
51 
are paid from value product, not physical product. 
Douglas compared value productivity with real earnings both 
in The Theory of Wages and Real Wages in the United States 
and determined that for the period 1890-1925 the laboring 
class in the manufacturing industry was receiving its just 
share of the value product of the industry. Table XIII 
would tend to point out that real earnings were running 
ahead of value productivity by a wide margin up until 1919, 
contra to the statistics on physical productivity, and that 
50 Douglas, Real Wages, pp. 510-514. 
51 Ibid., p. 525. 
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Year 
1899 
1904 
1909 
1914 
1919 
1921 
1923 
1925 
Table XII 
Comparative Movement of Real Earnings and Physig~l 
Productivity per Employee in all Manufactur ing 
Percentage 
Average Relative Relative Divergence 
Annual Real Physical of Real 
Earnings Earnings Productivity Earnings 
(in dollars) per Employee from Physical 
Production 
437 100 100 0 
496 101 110 
-8 
548 106 117 
-9 
631 106 116 
-9 
1246 118 113 +4 
1236 117 117 0 
1319 132 138 
-4 
1330 130 154 
-16 
52 Douglas , Real Wages, p. 510. 
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Chart Dl 
Comparative Movement of Real Earnings and Physig~l 
Productivity per Employee in all Manufacturing. 
53 Douglas, Real Wages, p. 511. 
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-Table XIII 
Comparison of Relative Value of Product per 
Employee with Real Earnings for ~4ne Major 
Groups of Manufacturing 
1899 = 100 
Percentage 
Relative Relative Deviation 
Real Value of Relative 
Year Earnings Product Real Earnings 
per per from Relative 
Employee Employee Value Product 
1904 101 98 +3 
1909 105 97 +8 
1914 105 96 +9 
1919 116 92 +26 
1921 115 105 +1o 
1923 128 121 +6 
1925 125 126 
-1 
54 Douglas, Real Wages, p. 529. 
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not until 1925 was value productivity able to surpass real 
earnings by a slim margin. 
Although Douglas had attempted to prove statistically I 
that the purchasing power of labor had kept astride with the 
increase in value productivity, his work did not fill in all 
the gaps in his conclusions. Wages in either a new industry ! 
I 
or a monopolistic one would not be determined by the value 
productivity in manufacturing alone, but by the value pro-
ductivity of labor in all of industry, finance, farming, 
government, and other services. Thus, Hansen believed that 
Douglas should have compared the real earnings of labor 
with the total quantity of goods and services produced, 
rather than with a few groups of industries, so that his 
conclusions about the overall trend of real wages would 
55 have a firmer foundation. 
Although Douglas' conclusions concerning the rise 
of real wages may not have been drawn perfectly tight by 
means of statistical methods, the foundations for his views 
for this period seem to be valid. The purchasing power of 
the workers was increased not only because of rising pro-
ductivity, but also through a retardation of the growth of 
the labor supply caused by a slower birth rate and immigra-
56 57 tion rate, a tremendous growth in capital supply, and 
55 Hansen, "Review of Real Wages," loc. cit., p. 751. 
56 Douglas, Real Wages, pp. 564-566. 
57 Ibid., p. 567. 
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trade unionism. However, the major contribution towards 
an improved development of purchasing power was the surge 
in productive output per worker. An increase in productivity 
of a product would tend to: either bring forth a better 
profit outlook for the employer, stimulating an addition of 
workers· to increase production further, thus creating in-
creased competition for labor and higher wages; or else 
reduce the cost, and thence the selling price of the goods, 
thus lowering the cost of living and increasing real wages. 
Retarded industries which could not raise their productivity 
would be recipients of the same rise in real wages, more-
over, since the value productivity of the workers would 
increase in line with other growing industries because of 
a higher return for each unit of their product. 
At the mid point of the twentieth century, the 
measurement of the purchasing power of the working class is 
still one of the most vital economic problems of the day. 
With the cost of living rising in great spurts in the quasi- 1 
war economy of the United States, the labor unions are 
constantly demanding higher and higher wage advances. 
Unionism during the past decade with its membership in the 
tens of millions and its huge treasuries has become the 
leading factor in fostering increases in wages by means of 
its potent bargaining power. Douglas had contended that 
58 Douglas, Real Wages, pp. 562-564. 
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unionization. was a tertiary force in provoking the rise in 
real wages of the 1890-1926 period since the rise in pro-
ductivity was the omnipotent factor; to-day, however, 
although the increased productivity of the worker may be 
one of its strongest bargaining points, trade unionism 
has superseded productivity as the main cause of increas-
ing real wages. 
Real Wages in the United States, 1890-1926 has proved 
to be one of the most significant works ever written in the 
field of wages. The outstanding value of the work is not 
the synthesis which Douglas has drawn concerning the causes 
of the increase in real wages of the working class, but 
rather the enormous range of statistics developed on the 
cost of living, hourly, weekly and annual wages and earn-
ings, and unemployment. Through this pioneering research 
effort in the field of real wages, a method of analysis was 
constructed which could measure more accurately than any 
former method the economic position and movement of the 
working class. The results of Douglas's arduous toil which 
indicated an increase o~ over 30 per cent in the real wages 
of the average manufacturing worker during the 1890-1928 
period in spite of a gradual reduction in the number of 
hours worked per week were substantial evidence of the tr~e 
merit of the free enterprise economic system of American 
democracy. Moreover, by developing indexes as measuring 
rods of different groups of workers, he was able to probe 
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into the differential movements of real wages between 
~j 
these 
groups. Then, an approximate interpretation could be made 
as to the relative growth of the purchasing power between 
types of employment~ Thus, Douglas' work on the trend or 
real wages has opened new vistas through which the problem 
of wage movements and the condition of workers could be 
interpreted in a more scientific fashion. 
C. Wage Theory 
In a recent conversation with Senator Douglas in 
59 Boston, when I raised the question of his theory of wages 
to him, he inquired if I had read his inauguration address 
60 
as President of the American Economic Association. When 
I replied in the affirmative, he remarked that that work 
contained a synthesis of all of his thirty years' work upon 
the wage theory; and that it was his major contribution 
toward supporting the marginal productivity theory which he 
had adopted from von Thfinen. It is interesting to note, 
moreover, that he remarked that he had had hopes of con-
tinuing his inductive study of wages to further substantiate 
the marginal productivity theory, but that a short time after 
59 The Copley-Plaza Hotel, Boston, Mass., on 27 January, 
1951. 
60 Presidential address delivered at the Sixtieth Annual 
Meeting of the American Economic Association, Chicago, 
Illinois, 29 December, 1947. 
"Are There Laws of Production?" American Economic 
Review, 38:1-41, March, 1948. 
I 
130 
61 his Presidential address, he was drafted as the Democratic 
Party's candidate for United States Senator from lllinois; 
thus, his work on wage theory was discontinued. 
In his work on the theory of wages, Douglas did not 
attempt to expound a new theory discovered by himself since 
he had accepted the marginal productivity. theory as the best 
"explanation of' the way in which wages and interest are 
' 62 
determined 'in a competitive and capitalistic society. 11 
Thus, Douglas followed the work of both von ThHnen who had 
first discovered that the rates of wages and interest were 
determined by the addition of the product which was made by 
63 the last unit of labor and capital, and John Bates Clark 
who stated that "general wages tend to be equal to the actual 
product created by the last laborer that · is added to the 
64 
social working force." To Douglas~ von ThHnen 1 s discovery 
of the theory of diminishing incremental productivity and 
the marginal determination of wages and interest~ and 
Clark's rediscovery of marginal productivity were the 
correct explanations of the theory of wages. His job, 
61 Loc. cit. 
62 Douglas~ Theory of Wages, p. 67. 
63 Von Thftnen, J. H., Der Isolierte Staat (Rostock, 1842; 
Reprinted .by G. Fischer Jena, 1930). 
64 Clark, John Bates, "The Possibility of a Scientific Law 
of Wages," American Economic Association Publications, 
4:49, March, 1889. 
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however~ was to test the validity of the marginal produc-
tivity theory by means o:f inductive, quasi-mathemati·cal, and 
statistical research. In relation to his work in this field, 
Douglas stated in The Theory of Wages: 
We need to know whether the assun~d curves of 
diminishing incremental productivity are merely 
imaginative myths or whether they are real 1 and 
if the latter what their slopes are. We need 
to know more about the supply functions of the 
factors of production and whether the actual 
processes of distribution furnish any degree of 
corroboration to the inductive tendencies dis-
covered. This book is an attempt to do just 
that. Since it is a pioneering study and since 
I am certainly not a mathematician, it undoubted-
ly has many lacunae and defects. But it is hoped 
that it at least furnishes a fruitful method of 
at·tack and that its results have significance. 65 
The marginal productivity theory which Douglas worked 
upon stated that entrepreneurs would employ workers until 
the value of the goods produced by the last worker employed 
was equal to the wages paid to that last worker. If the 
wages of the employees were lower than the value of the 
added goods produced, the entrepreneurs would continue to 
hire more workers and expand their production since they 
would be adding to their profits. The expansion of produc-
tion would not only lower the selling price of the goods 
because of the increased supply of units on the competitive 
market, but also it would make for a scarcity of workers 
and higher wages. When the entrepreneur would discover that 
65 Page xii. 
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his profits would be shrinking or costs were higher than 
profits because of the higher wage rates, he would cut off 
hiring additional workers at the point where the wage of a 
worker hired equaled the value of the goods produced by 
that worker. At this point productivity would bring the 
optimum profit to the entrepreneur; thus~ the wage rate 
would be set by the exchange value of that marginal product 
produced by the last worker. 66 
In 1928 Douglas~ with the assistance of Professor 
Cobb of Amherst College, first attempted to discover the 
67 
relationship between labor, capital, and production. 
The work was a time-study for manufacturing in which index 
numbers over time were made for labor (L), the number of 
men employed; capital (C), the amount of capital available 
for use; and product (P), the quantity of physical product. 
By statistically working with these three variables, it was 
discovered that the index of production was normally between 
the indexes of labor and capital; moreover, production was 
normally closer to labor than capital. A formula~ a simple 
homogeneous fUnction of the first degree~ was derived to 
3 1 1 -- 68 
work in the statistical data; it was P = l.OlL4 c4 ~ or, 
labor constituted three quarters and capital one quarter of 
66 Douglas, Theory of Wages, PP• 34-67. 
67 Cobb, Charles W. and Douglas, Paul H., "A Theory of 
Production," American Economic Review, Supplement, 
18:139-165, March, 1928. 
68 Ibid., P• 151. 
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any additions to production. Then, the formula was revised 
1 k 1-k 
so that P • bL C - ; b was independent of L and C and k was 
constant and equal to 3/4~ and the sum of the exponents 
69 
was equal to unity. By using these formulas it was 
possible to compare the theoretical index of production 
(P1 ) for each year of the period covered in the work, 1899-
1922. Thus, the Cobb-Douglas function was developed to 
test statistically the theory of marginal productivity; if 
this theory were applicable, and competition pure, labor's 
share in total productivity would be equal to P, or k. The 
results of the computations showed that k = • 75 and 1-lc = • 25 
and indicated that except for the year 1922 when the per 
cent deviation was +13, the differences between the theoreti-
cal and the actual production were small, the average devi-
l 70 
ation of P from P being 4.2 per cent. 
A further interesting comparison is afforded by 
the studies of the National Bureau of Economic 
Research into the proportion of the manufacturing 
product which went to labor during the decade 
1909-1918. They found that wages and salaries 
formed on the average 74 per cent of the total 
value added by manufacturers during these years. 
We have found in our fornmla that when we attri-
bute to labor 75 per cent of the product, we 
get a close consilience to the actual normal 
course of production.71 
The close corroboration between the theoretical and 
69 Cobb and Douglas, QE• cit., p. 156. 
70 ~., PP• 152-153. 
71 Ibid., P• 163. 
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actual figures made in this study reinforced Douglas' 
belief at that time that with an accurate measurement of 
labor and capital, productivity could be computed with a 
very close approximation to reality by means of the equa-3 1 
tiori P = 1.01 L4 c4 or P = bLkcl-k. 
Douglas' initial work in attempting to inductively 
substantiate marginal productivity was severely criticized 
by Professor Slichter. Since the theory assumed that given 
changes in all factors would bring about proportionate 
changes in their joint product, Slichter felt that Douglas 
did not establish the validity of the theory by statisti-
cally pointing out the relationship between labor and capi-
tal on one side and the volume of production on the other. 
Both land and entrepreneurship were omitted from the analy-
sis, and thus, the conclusions could be inaccurate. 72 More-
over, Slichter questioned the permanent validity of the 
constructed formula since "the assumption that x times the 
factors of production will yield x times the product pre-
supposes that technique remains substantially unchanged. 
Consequently, an equation which yields a fairly satisfac- I 
tory index of physical product f or one or two decades would I 
73 probably not do so for longer periods. 11 Finally, he 
72 Slichter, Sumner H., "Economic and Social Aspects of 
Increased Productive Efficiency-Discussion," American 
Economic Review, 18:168, March, 1928 
73 ~., P• 170. 
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remarked that since the equation held only "ephemeral 
accuracy," it could not be considered 11 the law of produc-
74 
tion." 
In his Hart~ Schaffner~ and Marx Prize work, The 
Theory of Wages, Douglas continued the study of the relative 
effect of labor and capital upon production. Professor 
Cobb, once again using the formula he derived in 1928 in a 
time study, analyzed the State of Massachusetts for the 
1 • 743 • 257 period 1890-1926 and discovered that P = 1.007 L c ; 
that is~ labor's share of the product was approximately 
75 74 per cent and capital's share was 26 per cent. The 
average deviation of the theoretical product from the actual 
was 6.5 per cent. Thus, the shares of the product of both 
labor and capital for the period covered in Massachusetts 
were almost exactly the same with the computations unearthed 
for the United States from 1899-1922. The Massachusetts 
investigation seemed to determine that: {1) an increase of 
1 per cent in labor with capital constant normally brought 
b t i f 74 of 1 t i h i 1 du t a ou an ncrease o Icrcr per cen n p ys ca pro c , 
and an increase of 1 per cent in capital with labor constant 
26 produced normally an increase of roo of 1 per cent in physical 
product; (2) an increase of 1 per cent in labor would cause 
26 a decrease of 100 of 1 per cent in its marginal productivity, 
and the same increase in capital would cause a reduction of 
~ of 1 per cent in its marginal productivity; (3) and 
74 Slichter, loc. cit., p. 170. 
75 Douglas, T~ry-;f Wages, P• 161. 
136 
since the elasticities of labor and capital were calculated 
as, -3.85 and -1.35, an increase of 1 per cent in the rate 
of wages would tend to bring about a decrease of 3.85 per 
cent in the quantity of labor demanded, and a similar in-
crease in the rate of interest would cause a decrease of 
1.35 per cent in the amount of capital demanded. 76 
The statistics of this investigation were not in close 
agreement, however:., if the period from 1921-1926 were 
omitted. The value of k was raised to .882 and 1-k lowered 
to .118 if the period covered was that of 1890-1920.77 The 
fact that the omission of a six year period could change the 
values of the . expo.nents so severely seemed to weaken the 
validity of the formula greatly. Douglas had no explanation 
to offer for this sharp disagreement of values. 
In another time-study for New South Wales for the 
period 1901-1927, the Cobb formula revealed that P1 = 
.6504 .3496 78 1.0179 L C This was the most satisfactory 
study of the three made up to that time in reference to 
deviation since the average deviation of the theoretical 
from the actual product was only 2.2 per cent, whereas in the 
Massachusetts study it was 6.5 per cent and in the United 
79 States study, 4.3 per cent. 
76 Douglas, Theory of Wages, 
77 M.£., p. 161. 
78 ~., PP• 167-169. 
79 ~., PP• 169-170 and P• 
P• 166. 
161. 
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The final time series study was made for Victoria 
manufacturing for the period 1907-1929, in 1938. In this 
work it was discovered that under the Cobb fo~nula, labor's 
share of the product was 71 per cent and capital's share 
29 per cent. Thus, an increase of 1 per cent in the quan-
tity of labor with capital constant caused a decrease of 
29 per cent in the marginal productivity of labor, and 100 
a similar increase for capital with labor constant caused 
a 71 per cent increase in the marginal productivity of 100 80 
capital. The actual average share of the net value 
product received by labor for the period was 61 per cent 
81 
while the formula had measured an average of 71 per cent; 
the deviation was, therefore, 14 per cent, a much larger 
deviation than had been computed in the previous studies. 
The wide disparity between the actual and theoretical com-
putations in Victoria could possibly have been caused by 
either the large degree of imperfect competition in Vic-
torian manufacturing or the state system of wage-fixing. 82 
In the first four time-studies made to measure the 
relative influence of L and C upon P under the formula 
p = bLkCl-k, a summation of the results obtained appears 
80 Handsaker, Marjorie L. and Douglas, Paul H., "The Theory 
of Marginal Productivity Tested by Data for Manufacturing 1 
in Victoria, II,u Quarterly Journal of' Economics, 52: 
215-216, Feb~ _, 1938. 1 
81 1£1£., PP• 223-224. 
82 Ibid., P• 243. 
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below: 
Coef'ficient Coef'ficient 
of of' 
Flexibilit~ Elasticiti 
Economy Time Period k 1-k Labor Capital Labor Capital 
United States 1899-1922 .75 • 25 -.25 -.75 -4.00 -1.33 
lVTas sachuset ts 1890-1926 .74 .26 -.26 -.74 -3.85 -1.35 
New South Wales 1901-1927 • 65 .35 -.35 -.65 -2.86 -1.54 
Victoria 1901-1929 .71 .29 -.29 -.71 -3.45 -1.41 
Thus, the results of ~research indicated a strikingly close 
agreement among the values found f'or k in the diff'erent areas. 
Even though there was close corroboration between the 
statistics discovered in the time-series studies, Douglas• in-
ductive work on marginal productivity was attacked as f'ollows: 
{1) The relationships between labor, capital, and product which 
had been f'ound could have been purely historical and not 
84 k 1-k 
causal. (2) The f'ormula, P = bL C , should be replaced 
by that of' P = bLkCj because the f'or.mer was inf'lexible as the 
sum of' the exponents was made equal to 1.0 and excluded the 
possibility of' increasing or decreasing returns for the system, 
whereas in the latter the sum of' the exponents k and j would 
85 
not have to equal unity or 1.0. (3) The time-series were 
f'aulty in that all the results obtained only minimized the 
errors in the production direction as the labor and capital 
I 
84 
85 
Douglas, Paul H., and Gunn, Grace, "Further Measurements of 
Marginal Productivity," Quarterly Journal of' Economics, 54: 
400-401, May, 1940. 
Ibid., P• 401. 
Durand, David, "Some Thoughts on Marginal Productivity with 
Special Ref'erence to Prof'essor Douglas' Analysis," Journal 
of' Political Economy, 45:740-758, December, 1937. 
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~~ ~x~onents were -=- =--==-==== assumed to be correct; if the assumed expo-
nents were minimized as well as production, then the results 
obtained would be entirely different than the measured 
statistics and would invalidate the value of the derived 
formula for measuring the actual marginal productivities of 
capital and labor. 86 
Douglas recognized the defects of his time-series 
studies of marginal productivity in his Theory of Wages 
when he pointed out that 11 the equation of production neeci 
not be the same for all periods and economies. 1187 Moreover, 
he remarked that, 11 one of the most interesting lines of in-
vestigation would indeed be to work out the relative amounts 
of capital combined with labor in the various countries and 
the relative effect of each upon production. This could 
"be studied in a cross-section fashion for any one year •••• n88 
Therefore, in 1939 in an attempt to overcome the 
criticism that his previous results demonstrated the effects 
of time, rather than productivity, Douglas made an inductive, 
cross-section ·study of manufacturing in the United States for 
89 the single year, 1909. For 1909, the amounts of capital, 
86 Mendershausen, Horst, 11 0n the Significance of Professor 
Douglas' Production Function, 11 Econometrica, 6:143-153, 
April, 1938. 
87 Page 203. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Bronfenbrenner, M. and Douglas, Paul H., "Cross-Section 
Studies in the Cobb-Douglas Function," Journal of Politi-
cal Economy, 47:761-785, December, 1939. 
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labor, and productivity in each of a series of given indus-
tries were determined with each industry in that year as an 
observation, instead of each year as in the previous t ime-
studies. Then, by utilizing the data obtained for ninety 
different industries and localities at a given point of time 
with the Cobb-Douglas function, the following results were 
obtained: (1) When P - bLkcl-k, k, the exponent of labor, 
was found to be .7496. (2) When P = bLkcj, the Durand 
modification of the formula, k = .7418. 90 Thus, the 
results tended to corroborate the results of the time-
series study for American manufacturing for 1890-1922 in 
which the value of k was .75 in comparison with the almost 
identical present findings of .7495 and .7418. 
The following year Douglas continued his work on the 
cross-section analysis and presented a study of manufactur-
ing for typical years in Victoria, New South Wales, and 
91 Australia as a whole. In the fi ve cross-section studies 
worked out in certain chosen years, each industry was taken 
as an observation with L, the average number of laborers 
employed, C, in the main total fixed capital, and P, the 
92 
net value added by manufacturing. The following results 
90 Bronfenbrenner and Douglas, loc. cit., pp. 773-775. 
91 Douglas, Paul H. and Gunn, Grace, "Further Measurements 
of Marginal Productivity,'' Quarterly Journal of Economics~ 
54!399-428, May, 1940. 
92 Ibid., pp. 403-406. 
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were obtained from thus study using the formula P = bLkcj 
93 
and minimizing in the P direction: 
Actual share 
of labor in 
Time Period k 
..i k+j value :2roduct 
Victoria 1910-1911 .74 .25 .99 .64 
Victoria 1923-1924 .62 .30 .92 .65 
Victoria 1927-1928 .59 .27 .86 .68 
Commonwealth of 
Australia 1934-1935 .64 .36 .99 .61 
New South Wales 1933-1934 .65 .34 .99 .51 
The results indicated that: (a) in general, there was 
some evidence of diminishing returns in Australian manufactur-
ing since the sum of the exponents was less than unity; (b) 
the values obtained were somewhat similar to the former time-
series work since an average of k for Victoria was .65 in 
comparison with .71 for• the time series, and the New South 
Wal es studies were exactly alike; (c) there was "a rough 
degree of correspondence between the actual share received 
by labor and that to be expected from the production func-
tion, and differences between them mew possibly be explained 
(1) by errors in the data, (2) by the existence of imperfect 
competition, and (3) by the operation of the regulation of 
94 
wages by the state." 
Again, in the following year, Douglas published the 
findings of another cross-section study for American 
93 Douglas and Gunn, loc. cit., pp. 414-419. 
94 Ibid., p. 421. 
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manufacturing in 1919. This work was slightly different 
from the previous studies inasmuch as in this work: {a) in 
the Cobb-Douglas formula, C represented not only fixed but 
also working capital; L represented not only the former 
group of the average number employed, but also firm members 
and salaries officers of corporations; and P represented the 
value added by manufacturing as before, but without any 
deductions for depreciation; and (b) the statistical data 
96 
were taken from the Census of Manufactures for that year. 
The results obtained in this study through the equation, 
P = bLkcj were k, the exponent of labor, was .76, and 
97 j, the exponent of capital, was .25. Thus, the value of 
k was almost exactly the same as the 1909 cross-section 
study when k was .74; and too, it was in almost identical 
agreement with the time-series studies for the United States, 
1899-1922, k = .75, and for Massachusetts, 1890-1926, 
k = .74. A disconcerting factor, however, in the study was 
that there was a decided difference in labor's actual and 
theoretical share of the value product; .60 in comparison 
98 
with .76. Nevertheless, once again the value of k was 
95 Gunn, Grace and Douglas, Paul H., "The Production Func-
tion for American Manufacturing in 1919, 11 American 
Economic Review, 31:67-80, March, 1941. 
96 Ibid., pp. 71-72. 
97 Ibid., pp. 72-73. 
98 Ibid., pp. 79-80. 
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found to be apprroximately 3/4 so that the conclusion could 
be drawn that an increase of 1 per cent in wages, everything 
else constant, would bring about a decrease of 4 per cent in 
the number employed since the elasticity of demand f-or labor 
would be -4.0. 
Senator Douglas had informed the writer in a personal 
99 . 
conversation that his address del1vered before the American 
Economic Association at his inauguration as President of 
that society, contained a summation of all of his inductive 
research on the marginal productivity theory. A careful 
study of the work substantiated the conversation. "Are 
There Laws of Production?il first, surveyed the development 
of the Cobb-Douglas formula as seen in past paragraphs; 
second, it outlined the findings of both the time-series and 
cross-section studies which have been reported in this paper; 
and, finally, it disclosed the findings of new inductive 
studies of the production function which had been made more 
recently. There were, therefore, in this article, "records 
for a total of twenty-nine inductive studies of the produc-
tion function instead of the three which were reported upon 
100 
thirteen years ago in The Theory of Wages." The follow-
ing table (XIV) will attempt to su~~arize the main results 
of these studies since it is a consolidation of all the time-
99 "Are There Laws of Production?" loc. cit. 
100 Ibid., p. 10. 
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Table XIV 
The Values of the Production Function ~or Manufacturing101 
.. 
p = bLkCj p k 1-k = bL c 
Economy Years k j k+j k 
A. Time-series 
u. s. (Series I) 1899-1922 .81 .23 1.04 .75 
" 
II II II) " II .78 .15 .93 .90 
II II II III) It " .73 .25 .98 .76 If It II IV) " " .63 .30 .93 .69 
B. Cross-sections 
United States 1889 .51 .43 .94 .53 
" 
II 1899 .62 .33 .95 .66 
If It 1904 .65 .31 .96 .68 
If If 1909 .63 .34 .97 .66 
II It 1914 .61 .37 .98 .63 
II It 1919 .76 .25 1.01 .75 
Average .63 .34 .97 .65 
c. Time-series 
Victoria 1907-29 .84 .23 1.07 .71 
New South Wales 1901-27 .78 .20 .98 .86 
D. Cross-sections 
Australia 1912 .52 .47 .99 .52 
II 1922-23 .53 .49 1.02 .52 
II 1926-27 .59 .34 .93 .64 
II 1934-35 .64 .36 1.00 .64 
It 1936-37 .49 .49 .98 .50 
Victoria 1910-11 .74 .25 .99 .75 
II 1923-24 .62 .31 .93 .61 
" 1927-28 .59 .27 .86 .60 New South Wales 1933-34 .65 .34 .99 .66 
Average all Commonwealth 
and State Studies .60 .37 .97 .60 
Average Commonwealth 
studies only .55 .43 .98 .56 
Average State Studies only .65 .29 .94 .66 
E. Time-series 
New Zealand 1915-16 .42 .49 .91 .51 
" " 1923-40 - - - .54 
F. Cross-sections 
South Africa I 1937-38 .66 .32 .98 -
" 
II II 1937-38 .65 .37 1.02 
-
Canada 1923 .48 .48 .96 .52 
II 1927 .46 .52 .98 .48 
II 1935 .50 .52 1.02 .48 
It 1937 .43 .58 1.01 .42 
Ne\v Zealand 1938-39 .46 .51 .97 -
101 Douglas, "Are There Laws of Production?tt loc. cit., 
adapted from Tables I, II, and III, pp. 12-18.---
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series and cross-sections made for manufacturing in the 
United States, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and 
Canada. 
From these inductive studies, Douglas found that there 
seemed to be a close corroboration of the values of k and j 
obtained from the cross-section studies for the United States, 
Australia, and South Africa. However, there were the ex-
pected divergences in values between the United States, on 
one side, and New Zealand and Canada, on the other; and 
there were differences in values in different years in the 
same country. 
But underneath all these differences, it is sub-
mitted that there has been "for the periods 
studied", a substantial core of stability within 
countries and that differences in technique, 
differences in the relative importance of given 
industries, and differences in the ratios of 
capital to labor may account for such devi~tions 
in the values of the exponents as exist.l02 
The results obtained from the difficult research were 
not completely satisfactory, however, in building up the law 
of productivity since some of the tests would not conform to 
the averages. The Massachusetts time-series which had 
unearthed the out-of-line value of k as .882 for the period 
1890-1920 as previously reported was reinvestigated; the 
results were again negative. Moreover, the tests indicated 
that if the time periods were shortened by eliminating some 
terminal years, the results were considerably changed. 
102 Douglas, "Are There Laws of Product ion?" loc. cit., 
p. 19. 
146 
I 
-=n -- ------==-=== 
Lastly:, when interspatial tests were attempted of individual 
states as separate observations, the results were again nega-
103 
tive. The failure of these tests, along with others 
previously reported in this paper, would seem to question 
the validity of the Cobb-Douglas function for measuring the 
theory of marginal productivity. In many instances, the 
studies tended to show an almost exact agreement between the 
labor share of product expected according to the marginal 
productivity theory and the actual share of product obtained 
by labor; then, in contrast, several studies brought forth 
wide variances between the actual and theoretical labor 
share. Therefore, the question would seem to arise as to 
whether Douglas t theory was a limited, rather than a general 
one since it might need to utilize a particular type of 
data within a certain time period for it to produce affirma-
t i v e result s • 
In order to strengthen the validity of the production 
function, Douglas analyzed the amount of deviation between 
the actual and theoretical products which had been obtained 
in the studies by computing the standard errors of estimate 
for each study. The analysis determined that: (a) in 2185 
industry observations in American manufacturing for the 
period 1889-1919, 76.5 per cent of the cases were within 
one standard error estimate between the actual and 
103 Douglas, "Are There Laws of Product ion?" loc. cit., 
p. 21. 
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theoretical product, 96 per cent were within one and two 
s tandard errors of estimate, and only .0075 per cent were 
104 
within more than three standard errors of estimate; 
(b) in 1373 industry observations of the British Dominions 
for specific years, 74.7 per cent of the cases were less 
than one standard error of estimate, and 94.7 were within 
one and two standard errors of estimate. 105 These statis-
tics strengthened the credence which could be placed in the 
production formula since the expected percentages for a 
normal distribution of observations were: 68.3, less than 
one standard error, 95.0, less than two standard errors, 
106 
and 1.0, more than three standard errors. Moreover, 
Douglas observed that any wide differences between the actual 
and theoretical values of product could be traced to monopo-
listic practices, "sweating," expanding and contracting 
industries, and over-competition. 107 
The final test of the reliability of the production 
formula was to compare the a pproximations between labor's 
actual share of the net value product and the theoretical 
estimates of this share. This comparison was made in Table 
XV from twenty cross-section studies of various years in the 
104 Douglas, 11Are There Laws of Product ion? 11 loc. cit., 
p. 28. 
105 Ibid., pp. 29-30. 
106 Ibid., p. 26. 
107 Ibid., pp. 33-35. 
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Table XV 
A Compari~on by Years or the Values or the Exponent or 
Labor in the Production Function (k) with the Unweighted 
Average of the 1~~ares of the Net Value Product Received by Labor (W/P) 
w 
k p 
Economy Years (theoretical) (actual) 
United States 1889 .51 .60 
II 11 1899 .62 .58 
" 
II 1904 .65 .64 
II It 1909 .63 .63 
tl It 1914 .61 .59 
Average .63 .605 
,t-\ustralia 1912 .52 .54 
II 1922-23 .53 .54 
II 1926'-27 .59 .57 
It 1934-35 .64 .61 
n 1936-37 .49 .51 
Victoria 1910-11 .74 .64 
II 1923-24 .62 .65 
II 192'7-28 .59 .68 
New South Wales 1933-34 .65 .66 
New Zealand 1938-39 .46 .57 
Canada 1923 .48 .50 
II 1927 .46 .48 
" 
1935 .50 .40 
If 1937 .43 .52 
Average all Commonwealth 
and State Studies .60 .58 
Average Commonwealth 
Studies only .55 .55 
Average Canadian Studies .47 .48 
108 Douglas, "Are There Laws of Production?" loc. cit., 
adapted rrom Tables VIII and IX, pp. 36-3g:-
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United States, Australia and its States, New Zealand, and 
Canada. , 
Table XV pointed out a striking degree of agreement 
between labor's theoretical and actual share of the product. 
In the United States studies, the average value of k, .63, 
was close to the actual share received by labor, W/P = .605. 
The British Dominions cross-section studies, moreover, were 
very close to agreement: Canada's average value of k was 
.47, and of W/P, .48; the average values of the Com.monwealth's 
studies only were exactly alike, .55; the average of all 
Co:rrnnonweal th and State studies showed that k was .60, and 
W/P was .58. Thus, as Douglas stated: "That, taken in the 
large, there is an almost precise degree of agreement be-
tween the actual share received by labor and that which, 
according to the theory of marginal productivity, we would 
109 
expect labor to obtain. 11 
Before w~king a brief su:rrnnation of Douglas' work in 
the field of wage theory, it should be noted that this paper 
has not included in its discussion the question of the 
probable supply curves of labor, capital, and natural re-
sources which was part of The Theory of Wages. The reason 
for this omission is that the writer determined that the 
most satisfactory approach to this section would be to trace 
the development of the production formula through all of the 
109 Douglas, "Are There Laws of Production?" loc. cit., 
P• 41. 
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inductive studies since Senator Douglas himself considered 
this development as his major contribution to the theory 
of wages. 
Therefore, in sum.mation, it should be noted that 
after the Cobb-Douglas formula was derived in 1928 to test 
the marginal productivity theory, Douglas, with the 
assistance of many others, worked upon a considerable number 
of inductive studies concerning the rela tionship between the 
changes in the quantities of capital, labor, and product. 
The statistics derived from these studies showed a substan-
tially close agreement between theoretical and actual values 
of the factors of production so that certain conclusions 
could be drawn: (1) a change of 1 per cent in the quantity 
of labor, with capital constant, brought forth a change in 
the opposite direction of from 1/3 to 1/4 of 1 per cent in 
the marginal productivity of labor; {2) the elasticity of 
the marginal productivity curve for labor in manufacturing 
would be between -3.0 and -4.0 since this curve was the 
relative percentage change in a factor which is required to 
effect a change of 1 per cent in the marginal productivity 
of the factor; (3) if the rate of wages is decreased by 
1 per cent, there will be an increase of 3 to 4 per cent in 
the number of workers employed; if the rate of wages is in-
creased by 1 per cent, there will be a decrease in the num-
ber of workers employed; (4) in the production formula, the 
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share of the value product received by a factor tends to 
approximate under pure competition its own exponent. 
Concerning the results obtained in these studies, Douglas 
stated: 
It is submitted that the results are, on the 
whole, corroborative. If they were purely 
accidental, as some have charged, they would 
show widely varying results. The fact that 
on the basis of fairly wide studies there is 
an appreciable degree of uniformity, ••• fairly 
clearly suggests that there are laws of pro-
duction which can be approximated by inductive 
studies and we are at least approaching them.llO 
There can be no doubt that Douglas has contributed 
enormously to an understanding of the marginal productivity 
theory of wages by his inductive studies which have attempted . 
to measure labor's share of productivity. However, in an 
analysis of his theory of wa ges, it is important to question 
the reality of the theory which maintained that the worker 
would be paid a wage equal to the value of the marginal add i-
t ion which the worker applied to the product. 
In order for the marginal productivity theory of 
wages to function perfectly, many assumptions must be made 
such as: a system of perfect competition, mobility of labor 
and capital, full employment, equal bargaining power between 
labor and management, and flexible prices. Douglas under-
stood that many of these assumptions upon which the theory 
110 Douglas, "Are There Laws of Production?" loc. cit., 
pp. 20-21. 
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was based were not completely valid in the economic system. 
Therefore, he modified the relative validity of the assump-
111 
tions of marginal productivity in the following manner. 
1. Largely valid but not wholly so. 
a. Knowledge by business men of relative productive-
ness of labor and capital. 
b. Mobility of capital. 
c. (Prior to the passage of the National Recovery 
Act. ) . 
Non-interference by the Government in terms of 
the wage contract. 
2. Primarily valid but with a strong opposing tendency. 
a Competition between laborers for work. 
b. Mobility of labor. 
c. Competition between employers for laborers. 
3. Partially true but on the whole not true. 
a. All capital is employed. 
b. All labor is employed. 
c. Laborers know their productivity. 
d. The bargaining powers of labor and capi tal are 
equal. . 
e. (Since the passage of the National Industrual 
Recovery Act. ) • 
Non-interference by the Government in terms of 
the wage contract. 
Douglas did not believe that the credence of the theory 
was destroyed by the differences between the basic assump-
tions and the actual functioning of the economy since he 
felt that ttthe method of the marginal productivity school 
112 
has described a portrait of realj_ty." In his belief, 
wage rates which were less than marginal productivity would be 
111 Douglas, Theory of Wage~ p. 94. 
112 Ibid , p. 95 
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increased by business competition, and wages which were 
above the marginal product would be decreased by tb~ 
competition of laborers for employment. 
The forces upon which the productivity school 
built their theories are, therefore~ not fic-
titious, but are instead powerful. To the 
extent that they are operative, the conclusions 
which are drawn from them are valid, and the re-
sults are modified but n o t vitiated by the 
presence of other forces which are at work as well. 113. 
Although the marginal productivity theory of wages 
has formulated an approach to the problem of wage determina-
tion which has indicated the relati onship betv-reen wages 
and productivity, the theory does not seem to describe 
Douglas ' "portrait of reality". From the writer ' s limited 
experience as an employee of the Government and as an 
employer in the retail business and in the garment industry, 
marginal productivity has not been the deciding factor in 
determining wage rates. The Government operates in a non-
competitive field in which it is, to a large degree, free 
from the intense rivalry of other business concerns. Cost 
is not a seemingly important factor in government opera-
tions; and the relati on of the amount of employment in the 
government service to the labor cost involved is of minor 
importance. Thus, although outside competition has some 
effect upon the government ' s wage rates from the standpoint 
-------------------------------
113 Douglas, Theory of Wages, p. 95 
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At mid-century, wages in the garment industry are 
determined through processes of collective bargaining rather 
than by marginal productivity. Since over ninety per cent 
of the workers in this industry are either members of the 
Amalgamated Clothing Union, a C.I.o. union in menswear 
manufacturing, or the International Ladies Garment Workers 
Union, an A.F. of L. affiliate, the wages of the workers 
can be set by negotiations between national employers' 
associations and the unions. Thus, the competitive labor 
market with its concomitant feature, individual bargaining, 
is eliminated, and wages are not a matter of debate between 
the individual employer and his workers. In the garment 
industry, as in other industries in which labor unions have 
great power, wages are not determ.ined by the laborer's 
marginal addition to the net product, but rather by a bargain 
theory of wages in which a wage scale is formulated in 
accordance with the relative barga.ining strength of labor 
and management. In line with this reasoning, ,Professor 
Dunlop has stated: 
As a result of the growth of labor organizations, 
particularly in the past 15 years, the wage level 
of the country is very significantly determined 
by the processes of collective bargaining. It is 
unfair to estimate the influence of collective 
bargaining on the wage structure sliaply by refer , 
ring to the number of wage earners organized. 
With collective bargaining so extensive~ its influ-
ence on wage rates extends far beyond the particu-
lar wage bargains. Although it is commonly esti-
mated that there are about 15 million organized 
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wa ge earners in the country, the main features 
of the wage structure of whole segments of our 
economy, like mining, manufacturing, transpor-
tation and communication, and construction are 
effectively set by collective bargaining ---
sectors with almost 25 million wage and salary 
earners. 114. 
In addition to monopoly, the immobility of labor, 
and collective bargaining, a final negative factor which 
tends to undermine marginal productivity as a general wage 
theory is unemployment. Although Douglas has admitted that 
the full employment of labor, one of the prerequisites of 
the the ory, was just partially valid in the economy, he did 
not emphasize sufficiently how u nemployment weakened the 
structure of the theory. According to the marginal pro-
duct ivity theory , unemployment could be cured by a r eduction 
in the \..rage rates since idle -vwrkers indicated that the labor 
force -vms being paid a wage scal e above its marginal pro-
ducti vi ty. Hm..revwr, the complexiti es of the unemployment 
issue could not be solved by merely reducing wages as Douglas 
had himself observed in both The Problem of Unemployment 
and Controlling Depressions since one unfortunate aspect of 
the capitalistic economy has been the "boom or bust" tenden- . 
cies of the business cycle. During a depression, a reduc-
tion in the wage rates does not necessarily tend to increase 
llL~ Dunlop, John T., "American Wage Determination': The Trend 
and Its Sign ifi cance," a paper read before the Economic 
Institute on Wage Determination and the Economics of 
Liberalism, The Ch~mber of Commerce of the United States, 
January 11, 1947. 
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employment; rather, it may further cut the purchasing 
power of the wage earners and stagnate the economy. At 
this time, when millions of workers are idle, the supply 
of labor being greater than the demand for the factor 
will tend to bring forth competitive underbidding for 
jobs so that wages will fall below its marginal product. 
'I 
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Chapter VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
In Paul Howard Douglas' life~ the past reflects upon 
years in which the man was constantly struggling with prob-
lems: subjective problems relating to his own character, 
problems in respect to the political society, and, in the 
main, problems concerning the structure of the economy. 
This period of grappling with these issues ends for Douglas 
in 1948 upon his election to the United States Senate. For 
by that time, the man had solved certain inner conflicts 
and had formulated his ideas into a fixed pattern so that 
he was able to emerge upon the political scene as a giant 
in strength and in intellect. 
The paucity of educational facilities in the Maine 
backwoods during his formative years did not dampen the 
intellectual keenness of the youth, Douglas, in any way. 
Rather, not unlike Lincoln in many respects, it developed 
within him both an understanding of the rudimentary problems 
of the common man and an aching thirst for knowledge. These 
attributes were the driving forces within the man which made 
him probe into the economic cancers of society in an attempt 
to solve the degrading afflictions of the workers. 
Since this work is b~sically a discussion of 
159 
Douglas' economic endeavors, no attempt will be made to 
draw conclusions about his development in the past aside 
from that field. However, it is important to record that 
he was able to think through t wo of his most vexing problems, 
pacifism and radicalism, during this period. His pacifistic 
leanings in World War I which caused him so much inward 
concern for years after the struggle were obliterated upon 
the advent of the next struggle for survival. In this 
conflict having resolved that militaristic strength alone 
could overcome the evil forces of aggression, Douglas cast 
aside the tenets of pacifism to fight actively for the 
democratic cause. He emerged from the fray a wounded combat 
hero. Moreover, his radical political tendencies as por-
trayed in The Coming of a New Party in 1932 were mainly 
dissolved a few years 1a ter when he determined that a 
socialistic type of third party movement was not necessary 
since the Democratic Party under President Roosevelt was 
attempting to elevate the stature of the common man. 
One of Douglas' most important contributions in the 
field of economics has been the methods of approach which 
he has taken in attempting to study problems. His major 
technique has been to develop a statistical record of the 
history of the problem and then, to simplify the trends of 
the issue in index numbers. In The Problem of Unemployment 
before grappling with theories for overcoming the economic 
illness, he, first, measured the runount of unemployment 
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in the United States for the period of 1890-1926 in order 
to illustrate the true extent of the seriousness of the 
problem. His work, Real Wages in the United States, 1890-
1926, was a monumental task in which in order to measure 
the material progress of the workers during the years indi-
cated in the title, he had to create a new cost of living 
index, compute the earnings of both the employed workers 
and the total labor force, measure the amount of unemploy-
ment1 and thereby, index the movement of real wages of the 
workers. The extent of Douglas' statistical and inductive 
analysis on this project was so vast that it required 
approximately 3~000,000 computations in over a six-year 
period of research before this book could be published. In 
wage theory, once again, Douglas utilized an inductive, 
quasi-statistical, and scientific method to attempt to 
verify the Cobb-Douglas formula of production. Over twenty 
years of inductive research was spent in testing the theory 
of mai•ginal productivity by means of the formula. Thus, 
Douglas was instrumental in organizing the fields of unemployL 
ment and wages in more definite terms by means of the scien-
tific approach so that he and others could mare accurately 
describe and understand the workings of these economic sub-
jects. 
However, Douglas was not satisfied with merely open-
ing the doors of economic discovery so that other economists 
could have clear data for their theories. If there were a 
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problem, Douglas would attempt to solve it. The Great De-
pression commencing in 1929 exposed the weaknesses or the 
capitalistic economy in the downward phase of the business 
' cycle; it illustrated all too vividly the insecurity of the 
worker. Douglas wasted .little time in attacking the 
tremendous issues or depression and unemployment. His 
program for overcoming these economic ulcers was rorthright 
and practical, not a nebulous ma:ze of theory. Thus, he was 
a harbinger of the New Deal when he advocated a comprehen-
sive program of unemployment insurance to both provide a 
minimum or security for the worker idle because of the 
. disintegration of the economic system and to stimulate the 
parts of the economy by providing a new flow of purchasing 
power into its mechanism. Douglas• strength in fighting 
for unemployment insurance was one of the contributive 
forces in the adoption of the program which is now con-
sidered an integral phase of tl::e American way of life. 
Moreover, he was instrumental in the establishment 
of employment exchanges in the United States. In his 
writings, Douglas traced the history of the employment ex-
change system in Europe so that its merits in alleviating 
joblessness could be clearly understood in the United States. 
Both the federal and the state governments have long since 
accepted the ·practicability of utilizing employment ex-
changes as the central force in stepping up the mobility of 
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labor and in handling unemployment security. 
Douglas was both practical and powerful in his attack 
upon depression. He was one of the prophets who advocated 
11 pu.mp-prirning 11 to aid in unharnessing the wheels of the 
economic machine from its immobile condition. Government 
spending could be the most powerful factor in rifling 
purchasing power into the hands of the wage-earner who 
would proceed to buy the necessities of life and, thereby, 
stimulate the flow of production. Planned public works in 
times of crisis which he advocated has been adopted by the 
many planning commissions in this country as the most 
affirmative method of overcoming periods of economic 
stagnation. 
Thus, the Douglas approach to the problems of de-
pression and unemployment has become the accepted method of 
dealing with these economic blights. Both the "New Deal 11 
and the Keynesian revolutions brought social security and 
11 pump-priming" to the forefront as being the most satisfac-
tory means of protecting the people from economic chaos and 
vibrating the wheels of production. Although Douglas advo-
cated govermnent spending in the downswing phase of the 
business cycle in his writings, he was not a potent factor 
in bringing that theory into practice during the Roosevelt 
administration. On the other hand, by his vigorous work in 
behalf of unemployment insurance on various state 
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unemployment commissions, he was one of the leading forces 
behind the ultimate ado.ption of this type of legislation 
in government. 
In the study of wages, Douglas has attempted to 
clarify a most complex economic factor. In his herculean 
ef f orts to measure the condition of the workers, he has 
succeeded, where others have failed, by digging into the 
wage ground with both the statistical tools passed down to 
him and with newly created tools whenever the old ones dis-
integrated. His statistical and inductive methods of 
measuring the material progress of the American workers was 
a beacon for other economists who desired to interpret 
real wages. 
It is difficult to evaluate Douglas' contribution 
in the field of wage theory since so many conflicting fac-
tors have emerged to attempt to invalidate his theories. 
The Cobb-Douglas function which he has relied upon to test 
marginal productivity has shown both positive and negative 
results. In many of his induc t ive projects, he has obtained 
a surprising degree of approximation between labor's 
theoretical and actual share of the product. Yet, in other 
studies, the above relationship has not been forthcoming. 
Although Douglas has attempted to explain the negative re-
sults as being part of the abnormal workings of the economy, 
these results have cast serious doubts about the validity 
of the function as a general wage theory. Moreover, the 
number of inductive tests which have been made with this 
function are not of a sufficient amount to measure its 
true value in the field of wages. Also, as it has been 
explained in the text of this paper, in general,marginal 
productivity has appeared ,to have lost ground in the last 
two decades as the correct theory for wage determination; 
the rise of powerful trade unions has made collective 
bargaining the most potent factor in wage determination. 
In many of his works, Douglas often quoted Lord 
Kelvin's dictum: 
When you can measure what you are speaking 
about and express it in numbers, you know 
something about it; but when you cannot 
measure it, when you cannot express it in 
numbers, your knowledge is of a meager and 
unsatisfactory kind. 
That dictum reflects a perfect image of Paul Howard Douglas' 
major contributions in economics. 
I 
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